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INTRODUCTION
Recently, few subjects in the study of international human rights
law, international relations theory, or contemporary international poli-
tics have captured as much attention as the phenomenon of self-
determination. Although self-determination is a topic in and of itself,2 it
1. JOHN LENNON, Imagine, on IMAGINE (Emd/Capitol 1971) (second stanza).
2. The literature attesting to this fact is substantial. For a sampling of articles that
were written on the subject between the years 1994 and 1995, consider the following,
which includes only those articles that employ the term "self-determination" in their
titles: See W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, Self-Determination, in UNITED NATIONS LEGAL
ORDER 349 (Oscar Schachter & Christopher C. Joyner eds., 1995); James A. Graff,
Human Rights, Peoples, and the Right to Self-Determination, in GROUP RIGHTS
186 (Judith Baker ed., 1994); Hurst Hannum, Minorities, Indigenous Peoples, and
Self-Determination, in HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR THE NEXT CENTURY I
(Louis Henkin & John Lawrence Hargrove eds., 1994); Jeff J. Corntassel & Tomas
Hopkins Primeau, Indigenous "Sovereignty" and International Law: Revised
Strategies for Pursuing "Self Determination, " 17 HUM. RTS. Q. 343 (1995); Laur-
ence S. Hanauer, The Irrelevance of Self-Determination Law to Ethno-National
Conflict: A New Look at the Western Sahara Case, 9 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 133
(1995); Sam Blay, Self-Determination: A Reassessment in the Post Communist
Era, 22 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 275 (1994); Bill Bowring, The Rule of Law as
an Instrument of Oppression? Self Determination and Human Rights, 5 LAW &
CRITIQUE 3 (1994); Richard Falk, Problems and Prospects for the Kurdish Strug-
gle for Self-Determination After the End of the Gulf and Cold Wars, 15 IdICH. J.
INT'L L. 591 (1994); Markus B. Heyder, Note, The International Law Commis-
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also relates to myriad other issues, including nationalism,' women,'
minorities,' statehood,6 group rights,' indigenous peoples,' ethnicity,
sion 's Draft Articles on State Responsibility: Draft Article 19 and Native American
Self-Determination, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 155 (1994); Frederic L. Kirgis,
Jr., Comment, The Degrees of Self-Determination in the United Nations Era, 88
AM. J. INT'L L. 304 (1994); Eric Kolodner, The Future of the Right to Self-
Determination, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 153 (1994), Robert McCorquodale. Self-
Determination: A Human Rights Approach, 43 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 857 (1994);
Gerry J. Simpson, Judging the East Timor Dispute: Self-Determination at the In-
ternational Court of Justice, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 323 (1994);
V.T. Thamilmaran, Self-Deterination: A Minorities Perspective, 6 SRI LANKA J.
INT'L L. 271 (1994).
3. See, e.g., William A. Schroeder, Nationalism, Boundaries and the Bosnian
War: Another Perspective, 19 S. ILL. U. L.J. 153 (1994); ELIE KEDOURIE,
NATIONALISM (1993) (discussing nationalism issues as they relate to self-
determination).
4. See generally Karen Knop, Why Rethinking the Sovereign State is Impor-
tant for Women's International Human Rights Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN:
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 153 (Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994);
GENDERED STATES: FEMINIST (RE) VISIONS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
THEORY (V. Spike Peterson ed., 1992); CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A
FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989); Hilary Charlesworth & Christine
Chinkin, The Gender of Jus Cogens, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 63 (1993); Christine NI.
Chinkin & Shelley Wright, The Hunger Trap: Women. Food, and Self-
Determination, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 262 (1993) (relating women's issues to self-
determination).
5. See generally Thamilmaran, supra note 2 (commenting that self-
determination also relates to minorities).
6. See Frederick W. Jjuuko, The State, Democracy and Constitutionalism in
Africa, 2 E. AFR. J. PEACE & HUM. RTS. 1 (1995); Makau wa Mutua, Why Redraw
the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Inquiry, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1113 (1995);
Unmaking and Remaking the State, 36 AFR. CONFIDENTIAL I (1995) (explaining
that literature discussing the decline or the transformation of statehood has cap-
tured the fancy of a number of writers, particularly after the traumatic post-cold
war examples of Somalia, Liberia, the former Yugoslavia, and the former Soviet
Union, in addition to other states that seem more stable); cf Vivien Schmidt, The
New World Order Incorporated: The Rise of Business and the Decline of the Na-
tion-State, 124 DAEDALUS 75 (1995) (analyzing the same notion with respect to
states in the so-called "North").
7. See generally Graff, supra note 2 (applying self-determination to the issue
of group rights).
8. See generally Julian Burger & Paul Hunt, Towards the International Pro-
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and secession.' These issues are just a few that have been appropriated
to the cause of self-determination." At the same time, one can clearly
discern the ebb and tide of interest in the concept over the past several
decades, during which self-determination became an issue of topical
concern. For the purposes of this article, the volatile phases of self-
determination are divided into three parts. First, this Essay will discuss
the aftermath of the two World Wars and the period of decolonization.
Second, it will comment on the debate over the New International Eco-
nomic Order ("NIEO") and the promulgation of the Declaration on the
Right to Development. Third, this Essay will address the demise of the
hostilities of the Cold War, which has been attended by the resurgence
of conflictual ethnicity. This demise has also heightened calls for the
recognition of the rights of minorities and indigenous peoples, and has
created an overall turbulent and unstable situation, particularly for the
state.
tection of Indigenous Peoples' Rights, 12 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 405 (1994); Elsa
Stamatopoulou, Indigenous Peoples and the United Nations: Human Rights as a
Developing Dynamic, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 58 (1994); Erica Irene Daes, Some Consid-
erations on the Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination, 3 TRANSNAT'L
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1993); Mdivan Clech Lfim, Making Room for Peoples
at the United Nations: Thoughts Provoked by Indigenous Claims to Self-
Determination, 25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 603 (1992).
9. See Asmelash Beyene, The Nationality Question, Secession and Constitu-
tionalism: The Case of Ethiopia, in STATE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM: AN AFRICAN
DEBATE ON DEMOCRACY 129 (Issa G. Shivji ed., 1991).
10. See, e.g., Minasee Haile, Legality of Secessions: The Case of Eritrea, 8
EMORY INT'L L. REv. 479 (1994); Angela M. Lloyd, The Southern Sudan: A Com-
pelling Case for Secession, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 419 (1994); Holly A.
Osterland, National Self-Determination and Secession: The Slovak Model, 25
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 655 (1993) (applying self-determination to the issue of
secession).
11. See LAm, supra note 8, at 615-16 (noting that such an appropriation of the
notion is possible, in part because of the international community's ambivalence
about the meaning and content of self-determination and also due to the interna-
tional community's desire to keep a lid on what is largely viewed as a veritable
global Pandora's Box).
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The discussion of the first two parts fits within the relatively clear
legal boundaries of positivism.'2 However, the contemporary discourse
regarding the rise of problems in the former Yugoslavia, Chechnya,
and Somalia, and the impotence of the international community's re-
sponse to these crises, is more reflective of our times-anarchic, inde-
terminate, 3 and highly ambivalent.'4 Furthermore, despite the profound
development of capitalism and technology, and the phenomenal exten-
sion of neo-classical models of economic order-reflected domesti-
cally in Thatcherite and Gingrichian economics and internationally in
12. Positivism denotes the debate regarding whether or not the right to self-
determination was contained in "the law." The League of Nation's approach to the
phenomenon of self-determination was that no such right existed, whereas the
United Nations brought the right to prominence in its Charter.
13. See Dencho Georgiev, Politics or Rule of Law: Deconstnction and Legiti-
macy in International Law, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1 (1993) (reviewing the literature
attesting to this "indeterminacy"). Georgiev asserts that the indeterminacy of our
times is:
prompted by the observation that the end of the cold war has not only occa-
sioned democratization throughout the world, it has also released long-
frustrated nationalist aspirations. By no mere logic did democratization re-
quire the reunification of Germany or the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
Granting that the Soviet government was evil, did it follow that the Soviet
Union was an evil empire, its people not just oppressed but conquered and
colonized?
Id. Cf Guyora Binder, The Kaplan Lecture on Human Rights: The Case Jbr SellF
Determination, 29 STAN. J. INT'L L. 223, 224 (1993) (asserting that this era has
produced a distinction between "universalist" and "nationalist" components of
self-determination).
14. See Richard DeGeorge, The Myth of the Right of Collective Sell-
Determination, in ISSUES OF SELF-DETERMINATION 1, 2 (William Twining ed.,
1990) (employing a Levi-Straussian method of analysis to illustrate how the notion
of self-determination is in part a myth which "both reveal[s] and hide[s] parts of
reality, and serve[s] to make sense of and validate certain actions"). At the same
time, self-determination is highly ambiguous in part because of the difficulty of
specifying exactly what it means and how it is to be ascertained:
[s]ometimes the right of self-determination is used with respect to and forms
part of consent theories. Sometimes it is used with and forms revolutionary
theories. And at still other times it is used with and forms part of democratic
theories. Each of these variants is part of the myth, and all together form the
myth-system of which it belongs.
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the World Bank's and International Monetary Fund's ("IMF") Struc-
tural Adjustment Programmes ("SAPs")'5-- the discussion has drawn
little that is new from the notion of economic self-determination.'" It is
as if self-determination has been shorn of all its economic elements'
and his become solely concerned with borders, territory, and nation-
statism. The failure to relate self-determination to human rights-the
conceptual and philosophical regime from which the subject derived
inspiration-is particularly disturbing."
15. See Phillip Alston, The Universal Declaration in an Era of Globalization,
in REFLECTIONS ON THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A
FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY ANTHOLOGY 29 (Barend van der Heijden & Bahia Tahzib-
Lie eds., 1998). See generally AUTHORITARIANISM, DEMOCRACY AND
ADJUSTMENT: THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC REFORM IN AFRICA (Peter Gibbon ct al.
eds., 1992). Structural Adjustment Programmes are economic measures designed
by the IMF and the World Bank to restructure the economies of developing coun-
tries, which were largely perceived to be mismanaged and bankrupt. Although
these programs have existed since the 1970s, they have only gained momentum
and application in the 1980s and 1990s. Overall, the austerity measures that the
IMF and Work Bank introduced are widely considered to have made the situation
worse in countries where they have been applied.
16. See International Covenant on Economic, Social, & Cultural Rights, Dec.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 4.
17. See generally Chinkin & Wright, supra note 4.
18. See id. Chinkin & Wright have also argued that:
This right to self-determination may be too narrowly defined. Political cohe-
sion sufficient to exercise a right of self-determination is generally defined in
terms of language, religion, race, or ethnic origin. This can in turn lead to ir-
redentist claims, aggressive practices toward "others" (who may be long-term
neighbors as in Bosnia-Herzegovina), and violent fragmentation within any
wider sense of Community. Serbia's intransigent pursuit of "self-
determination" has directly led to this "people's" increasing isolation from the
rest of the international community. But a "self' cannot solely consist of ter-
ritories, boundaries, and political instruments.
Id. at 293.
19. See Paul Goble, The Role of International Law in the Twenty-First Cen-
tury: Back to Biafra?: Defending Borders and Defending Human Rights in the
Post-Cold War Environment, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1679, 1680 (1995) (criticiz-
ing the tendency to omit the issue of individual human rights from the discussion
of self-determination by focusing solely on the group or collective). Goble reasons
that:
The former (human rights) is broader than the latter (self determination), be-
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This Essay is a modest attempt to fill in some of the gaps that con-
tinue to pervade discussions about self-determination today. In par-
ticular, it analyzes the relationship between self-determination and
statehood as we move toward the next millennium. Of special concern
is the need to develop novel and dynamic angles to the principles un-
derlying the right. Such concern is dictated by a number of distinct
limitations in previous theory, particularly with reference to the histori-
ography and dominant perceptions and presumptions about self-
determination within international law and in general theoretical dis-
course.20 The concern is also directed to an understanding of the tre-
mendous and varied pressures being brought to bear on the twentieth
century state and the need to critically revisit the second part of self-
determination, namely, the NIEO and the Declaration of the Right to
Development. Paramount in a reorientation of the concept is the need
to "degender" self-determination's predominant male focus, by bring-
ing women directly into the discussion on the subject and by firmly en-
sconcing feminist perspectives into the conceptualization of statehood
cause the former explicitly recognizes that groups may form and seek exit
from states for other ethno-national reasons, and because it allows for a dis-
cussion of the consequences of state-sponsored attacks on individuals and
their response instead of limiting the issue to state attack on groups.
Id. Even the vision of human rights must be seen in a holistic fashion-not merely
as civil and political rights but as economic, social, and cultural rights-rights that
Goble unfortunately omits from his discussion of the issue. See hi.; see also J.
Oloka-Onyango, Beyond the Rhetoric: Reinvigorating the Struggle/lbr Economic
and Social Rights in Africa, 26 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 1 (1995) (examining the need
for a comprehensive approach).
20. Among the perceptions, presumptions, and prejudices (both declared and
implicit in the literature) are the following: (1) the doctrine of self-determination
originates in the context of Euro-American liberation and revolutionary struggles;
(2) questions of gender and class are of no consequence to the exercise of the ight;
(3) economic, social, and cultural self-determination is less important than the po-
litical; (4) self-determination does not apply to non-colonial peoples; (5) the domi-
nant forces fostering the post-Cold War upsurge in demands for self-determination
and secession are ethnic or "primordial"; (6) the right to self-determination does
not extend to secession; and (7) no right of self-determination exists within the
context of a "democratic" state and representative government. Throughout this pa-
per, these perceptions are interchangeably referred to as the "dominant" or "tradition-
alist" perspectives.
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and self-determination. 2' A deeper consideration of these inherent
limitations in the concept of self-determination will hopefully draw us
closer to a more holistic and complete vision of the problems and pros-
pects for a democratic twenty-first century future.22
To accomplish the aforementioned objectives, this Essay addresses
several questions. First, what is self-determination, or the "official"
version of the concept, and how have the various biases that scholars
brought to the subject influenced the conceptualization of self-
determination and its expression in international human rights law?
Second, how has the law viewed self-determination and its relation to
the doctrine, or is the law irrelevant to self-determination? Finally, how
do the political and economic elements of self-determination relate to
each other and come together to help us effectively reach beyond self
determination? In other words, how can we arrive at a holistic inter-
pretation of the right to self-determination that is both true to the fact of
present-day realities and constraints, while simultaneously keeping the
flame of democratic aspirations alive? Accordingly, this Essay is not
concerned with the usual specifics of particular claims or generalized
theories about legitimacy, capacity, territory, or government that are
the usual focus of most discussions on the subject. Rather, this Essay
mainly considers the development of the political economy and epis-
temology of self-determination.
At the peril of repetition, and recognizing the fairly worn path al-
ready trodden by others in the intellectual maze of self-
determination, the Essay proceeds in the following fashion: Part I re-
visits the historical origins of self-determination. Part II critically ex-
amines the debate regarding the need for new methodologies of con-
sidering international law in general and self determination, human
rights, and statehood in particular. The second part also recapitulates
the arguments developed in the earlier sections of the Essay with a
precis of the challenges facing us in the twenty-first century, includ-
21. See Chinkin & Wright, supra note 4, at 301-02 (describing the inadequacy
in drafting and interpreting international legal regulations regarding the right to
exist because the regulations focus on the world of white European men).
22. See Ranee K. L. Panjabi, Human Rights in the 1990s: Promise or Peril?,
28 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 229, 230 (1995) (attempting to deal with the profound in-
tellectual pessimism and even defeatism that pervades intellectual discourse on
human rights issues today).
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ing a particular focus on the issues raised by the phenomenon of se-
cession.
I. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TWENTIETH
CENTURY SELF-DETERMINATION DOCTRINE
A. THE ORIGINS OF THE DOCTRINE OF SELF-DETERMINATION:
THE "OFFICIAL STORY"
1. Self-Determination before the Second World I1ar
Most theorists assert that self-determination was not considered a le-
gal right until after the Second World War.2' This view emanated in
part from the International Committee of Jurists' study established in
1920,24 which examined the question of whether the people of the
Aaland islands had a right to conduct a plebiscite on the issue of the
territory's potential separation from Finland and amalgamation with
Sweden.2 The Committee's view was that although self-determination
was important in modem political thought,' it was not incorporated
into the Covenant of the League of Nations, and, therefore, was not a
part of the positive rule of the Law of Nations.2'
United States President Woodrow Wilson attempted to incorporate
the notion of self-determination into international law, or at least into
international practice,2 ' an effort that resulted only in allowing for the
23. See Armen Tarazarian, Note, Nagorno-Karabagh "s Right to Political Inde-
pendence Under Iternational Law: An Application of the Principle of Sel-
Determination, 24 Sw. U. L. REv. 183, 193-95 (1994) (describing the emergence
of self-determination).
24. See The Aaland Island Question. Report of the Cominittee of Jurtsts,
LEAGUE OF NATIONS, 0. J. Spec. Supp. 3, at 5 (1920).
25. See Tarmzarian, supra note 23, at 193 (noting that the International Com-
mittee of Jurists adopted the traditional view of the principle of self-
determination).
26. See Kolodner, supra note 2, at 154 (detailing a brief history of the nse of
self-determination).
27. See id. (noting that commentators agreed that the concept of self-
determination commenced after World War I).
28. See id. at 154-55 (quoting Wilson's 1917 proclamation that "[n]o peace can
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
adoption of special treaties for the protection of minorities." Essen-
tially, Wilson's notion of self-determination was the recapitulation of
the concept of government by consent of the governed. 0 However,
given the outcome of Wilson's efforts" (now finding expression in the
collapse of Yugoslavia and the rise of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its at-
tendant problems), 2 the Wilsonian connection may well be one that
should not be overemphasized. 33
Such caution is particularly necessary since, as Mdivam Lam points
out in regards to the League, "the peoples protected by these treaties
played no formal role in either their construction or implementation. ' 4
Nevertheless, the intransigence of the colonial powers ensured that the
exercise of self-determination would be contained, at least for the in-
terim, forcing a telling silence on the issue of the self-determination of
last, or ought to last, which does not recognize and accept the principle that gov-
ernments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed, and that no
right exists to hand people about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were
property").
29. See Thamilmaran, supra note 2, at 272 (commenting on President Wilson's
support of minority rights as distinct in international law).
30. Cf Richard F. Iglar, Comment, The Constitutional Crisis in Yugoslavia and
the hlternational Law of Self-Determination: Slovenia's and Croatia's Right to Se-
cede, XV B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 213, 222 (1992) (discussing the Allies'
adoption of self-determination following World War I); UMOZURIKE OJI
UMOZURIKE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 13-20 (1972).
31. Wilson has been both praised and damned for his particular contribution to
the development of the notion of self-determination and the settlement at Ver-
sailles in 1919. See Anthony Whelan, Wilsonian Self-Determination and the Ver-
sailles Settlement, 43 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 99 (1994) (rigorously attempting to re-
habilitate Wilson). Unfortunately, even those who come to Wilson's defense, like
Whelan, are blind to the fact that Wilson wholly ignored the denial of human rights
and the discrimination-especially of the racial kind-in his own backyard, al-
though he told the world to clean up theirs.
32. See generally Schroeder, supra note 3, at 154 (discussing the secession of
Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia from Yugoslavia).
33. This is especially the case in light of the fact that Wilson simply borrowed
and modified the concept from Lenin. See Lam, supra note 8, at 614; see also V. I.
LENIN, THE RIGHT OF NATIONS To SELF-DETERMINATION (1968) (providing
Lenin's own views on self-determination).
34. See Lam, supra note 8, at 614-15 (discussing the League of Nations' at-
tempt to rearrange European borders after World War I).
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non-European peoples, still trapped within the vise of imperialism"
The short existence of the League of Nations ' may only in part be
on account of its failure to confront the issue of self-determination in a
direct manner.17 However, fascism and war soon eclipsed the League of
Nation's recalcitrance and brought the issue of self-determination back
to the fore." Consequently, in the League of Nation's successor organi-
zation, the United Nations (the "UN"), the doctrine of self-
determination gained a fairly significant foothold." This advancement
of the concept of self-determination in the UN obviously had as much
to do with the devastation of Hitler's hegemony as it did with the rum-
blings in India, the fractures inflicted to colonial preeminence by na-
tionalist agitation, and the greatly strengthened United States and So-
viet Union."° All of these factors contributed to and determined the
35. See Iglar, supra note 30, at 223 (stating that during the post-World War 11
decolonization process, self-determination was exercised by former colonies,
rather than by people).
36. See generally Phillip Vuciri Ramaga, The Bases qf Minoriy Ilentity, 14
HUM. RTs. Q. 409 (1992) (analyzing the history of the drafting of United Nations
Article 27 and its treatment of racial identities).
37. See Catherine J. Ioms, Indigenous Peoples and Self Determination: Chal-
lenging State Sovereignty, 24 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 199, 239-44 (1992) (re-
counting the history of the many definitions of self-determination, leading up to
the modem formulations of self-government).
38. See id. at 244 (discussing the Atlantic Charter, signed by both President
Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill on August 14, 1941, which affirmed the
principle of self-determination and, which was accepted in the Declaration of the
United Nations in 1942).
39. See generally T.M. Franck, Postnodern Tribalism and the Right to Seces-
sion, in PEOPLES AND MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (Catherine Brolmann
et al. eds., 1993). Professor Franck specifically states that:
[a]fter World War Two the imperfectly applied European principle of self-
determination lease of life as it was applied to former colonies and trust tern-
tories through the text of the UN received a new Charter. At the San Fran-
cisco charter-drafting conference, it was the Soviet Union, which first pressed
for the inclusion of a clause specifying, among the Organization's purposes,
the fostering of relations among states, "based on respect for the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples."
Id. at 7.
40. See generally id. at 3-27. The issue of self-determination was perhaps the
last on which the two, soon-to-become world superpowers agreed-albeit for dif-
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shape that self-determination assumed in the new organization.
2. The United Nations and Self-Determination
As a firm concept in international law, self-determination gained the
most acceptance under the framework of the UN, established in the af-
termath of the Second World War.4' A principal factor in the drive to-
wards the recognition of the concept was the formulation in the UN
Charter, which stressed "the respect for the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of people" as one of its paramount purposes.
During the initial years of its existence, the UN presided over the si-
multaneous dismantling of the European colonial empire and the evo-
lution of the doctrine of self-determination as a firm component of in-
ternational human rights law.43
The year 1960 represented the pinnacle in the development of the
legal framework of self-determination at the UN, with the Declaration
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 
4
4
ferent reasons-before the Cold War chill blew in to freeze any common under-
standings on international issues.
41. See generally id. at 8-16. (discussing the meaning of self-determination af-
ter World War II in such places as Africa, Europe, India, etc.).
42. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1(2). See also U.N. CHARTER art. 55 (listing eco-
nomic and social conditions that are necessary for positive relations among nations
based on the principle of self-determination of peoples).
43. See Rosalyn Higgins, Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to Secession, in
PEOPLES AND MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 29 (Catherine Brolmann et al.
eds., 1993) (taking a contrary view on this matter). Rosalyn Higgins asserts that:
it is one of the great myths that the UN Charter provided for and required self-
determination in the form in which it evolved. It did not, and to ignore the de-
velopment of the concept in ways quite unintended by the Charter is histori-
cally false. The very few references in the Charter to self-determination-Ar-
ticles 1(2) and 55-refer to friendly relations based on "equal rights and self-
determination." In each the context was clearly the rights of peoples of one
state to be protected from interference by other states or governments. It is re-
visionism to ignore the coupling of "self-determination" with "equal rights"-
and it was the equal rights of states that was being provided for, not of indi-
viduals. The concept of self-determination, as envisaged by the drafters of the
Charter, did not refer to the right of dependent peoples to be independent, or
indeed, even to vote."
Id.
44. See G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N.
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and the promulgation of the Principles Which Should Guide Members
in Determining Whether or Not an Obligation Exists to Transmit the
Information Called for Under Article 73e of the Charter."' While these
instruments were the first to expressly enshrine the right of self-
determination, they did not, as Iots points out, "'expand the scope of
the right .. to include minorities or indigenous peoples within states. ' '
It is also worth adding that the constraints extended even further, as
they did not recognize women, refugees, children, or other marginal-
ized social and political groups.
Perhaps the more important normative expression of the notion of
self-determination at the UN came in 1970, with the elaboration of the
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the UN
(The Principle of Equal Rights and Self-Determination of Individu-
als). 7 What was clear in the evolution of the instrument is the fact that
the UN (and the states controlling the institution) still sought to have it
both ways, by acknowledging the right to self-determination on the one
hand but significantly limiting its application on the other. On the
whole, the international community has approached the issue of self-
determination on an ad hoc basis, particularly in relation to the threat of
secession. The acceptance of a claim is largely dependent on the degree
of destabilization portended and the extent to which the responding
government represents the people belonging to the territory."
By remaining addicted to the concept of uti possidetis," however,
Doe. A/4684 (1960) [hereinafter 1960 UN Declaration].
45. See id. at 29.
46. Iotas, supra note 37, at 253-54 (stating that the Declaration of the Granting
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples neglected to apply the rght of
self-determination to minorities and indigenous people and that its purpose was to
achieve independence and self-government of colonies).
47. See G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N.
Doc. A/8028 (1970), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 1292 (stating the importance of the
Charter of the UN in maintaining peace, security, and friendly relations among
states).
48. See Ioms, supra note 37, at 310 (arguing that modem applications of the
self-determination doctrine may actually deny indigenous peoples the opportunity
to determine their own destiny).
49. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1546 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "un pos-
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the UN gave with one hand what it took away (or at least held at a dis-
tance) with the other ° and has constrained many to seek recourse by
force. The foregoing demonstrates that even during the UN era, there is
a great deal of contestation over the scope and extent of self-
determination as a legal principle." Frederic Kirgis has commented that
self-determination in the UN era "has a great many faces." 2 According
to Kirgis, the one notion that virtually everybody now agrees upon is
that self-determination is freedom from colonial domination, "at least
when the domination is of people of color in their homeland by racial
groups."" In fact, the degree of self-determination ascertainable (and
accepted by the international community) can be discerned in degrees,
culminating in 1993 with "the recognition that the right had arguably
expanded to be assertable against a government that is unrepresentative
of people who are defined by characteristics not limited to race, creed
or color.,1
4
Discussions on self-determination also address the meaning of the
terms "self'55 and "peoples. 56 Recent literature has attempted to draw a
sidetis" under international law as "a phrase used to signify that the parties to a
treaty are to return possession of what they have acquired by force during war").
50. See J. Klabbers & R. Lefeber, Africa: Lost between Self-Determination and
Uti Possidetis, in PEOPLES AND MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 57-58 (Cath-
erine Brolmann et al. eds., 1993) (discussing how the doctrine of uti possidetis can
be read into the 1963 Charter of the Organization of African Unity).
51. See generally Blay, supra note 2, at 275-92. Despite the assertion by many
prominent scholars that self-determination should be considered a peremptory
norm of international law (jus cogens), the debate is almost always joined by those
who write on the topic. It does not appear to be an extremely fruitful debate to en-
gage in and is thus omitted from consideration in this Essay. For a consideration of
the issue, see Robert McCorquodale, South Africa and the Right of Self-
Determination, 10 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 4, 4-5 n. 4-6 (1994), which considers
whether self-determination should be deemed a peremptory norm of international
law.
52. Kirgis, supra note 2, at 305.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 306.
55. See, e.g., R.S. Bhalla, The Right of Self-determination in International Law,
in ISSUES OF SELF-DETERMINATION 91-101 (discussing the various meanings of the
term "self" in international law).
56. See generally Richard N. Kiwanuka, The Meaning of "People " in the Afri-
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much closer linkage between self-determination and human rights."
For example, Robert McCorquodale points to the framework of inter-
national human rights law as being one that is adequate to ensure such
protection:
In resolving these competing rights the human rights approach, by using the interna-
tional human rights law framework, aims to protect all rights and not the right of self-
determination in isolation. Rights can then be balanced and a solution can be found
which protects both rights as far as possible in the circumstances."
However, McCorquodale is skeptical about the "peoples" approach
adopted in the two Covenants and the African Charter on Human and
Peoples Rights (the "Banjul Charter") 9 and urges that we should not
view self-determination as an absolute.6w According to McCorquodale,
there is a need to place restrictions on its exercise in order to ensure
that there is a fluid operation of the phenomenon.' We shall return to
this issue, but suffice it to note that the institutions of the international
community have been reluctant to uphold the right to self-
determination,6 although the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has
can Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 80 (1988) (dis-
cussing four definitions of "people" addressed in the Charter).
57. See, e.g., Lung-Chu Chen, Self-Determination as a Human Right, in
TOWARD WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY 198 (W. Michael Reisman &
Bums Weston eds., 1976) (proposing that the quest for self-determination is inte-
grally associated with considerations of human rights and dignity).
58. See McCorquodale, supra note 2, at 877 (stating that there are other op-
tions, in addition to secession, whereby peoples would be able to exercise their
right of self-determination). The other options include: "'the creation of a federa-
tion; guarantees of political power to defend or promote group interests; the giving
of special assurances (as with minority rights); providing for a specific recognized
status to a group; or by 'constitutional democracy."' Id.
59. See CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5. (1981), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 59 (1982). The
Charter was intended to be a human rights instrument reflecting African legal phi-
losophy and responsive to African needs. See id.
60. See McCorquodale, supra note 2, at 874-76 (arguing that absolute rights to
self-determination must be limited to protect other rights and should be construed
within the context of constitutional and societal realities).
61. See id. at 876-78 (arguing that the protection of competing rights requires
limitations on the absolute construction of self-determination in international law).
62. This is the case, for example, with Hong Kong. See Patricia A. Dagati,
Note, Hong Kong's Lost Right to Self-Determination: A Denial of Due Process in
the United Nations, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 153 (1992) (discussing
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given several opinions on the issue.63
Unfortunately, self-determination is not recognized as a right that
can be pursued by an individual and has thus so far been met with a
negative response when raised at the Human Rights Committee.64 This
position has remained fairly constant for a number of years despite at-
tempts to bring the issue up for attention." The principle reason is that,
in the observation of Mary Ellen Turpel, the area is "politically
charged.66 Similarly, recent analyses of the situation of social and po-
litical minorities in Western countries such as the United States, have
used the term to attempt to present their claims for greater autonomy
UN Resolution 1514, The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples, which is considered a highly authoritative source on the
principle of self-determination and is the legal basis for the UN's decolonization
policy). See generally B.G. Ramcharan, Security Council Patterns for Dealing with
Ethnic Conflicts and Minority Problems, in BROADENING THE FRONTIERS OF
HUMAN RIGHTS: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ASBJORN EIDE 27, 27-42 (Donna Gomien
ed., 1993) (concerning the operation of the Security Council, with particular re-
spect to the issue of minority rights).
63. See generally Gerry J. Simpson, Judging the East Timor Dispute: Self-
Determination at the International Court of Justice, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 323 (1994). See, e.g., South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa;
Liberia v. South Africa), 1966 I.C.J. 4 (July 18); Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v.
Republic of Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 662 (Dec. 22) (separate opinion of Judge Abi-
Saab) (discussing the meaning of "boundary" and the principle of uti possidetis);
Advisory Opinion No. 61, Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16) (answering
questions on the colonization of the Western Sahara).
64. See Klabbers & Lefeber, supra note 50, at 49-50 n.45 (explaining that the
individual communication procedure of Optional Protocol No. I to the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights denies an individual the opportunity
to assert the right of self-determination); see, e.g., Ominayak and the Lubicon Lake
Band v. Canada H.R.C. Report Doc.A/45/40, Vol. II, Annex IX, p. 1 at p. 27 (para.
32.1).
65. See Klabbers & Lefeber, supra note 50, at 49.
66. See Mary Ellen Turpel, Indigenous Peoples' Rights of Political Participa-
tion and Self-Determination: Recent International Legal Developments and the
Continuing Struggle for Recognition, 25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 579, 585-86 (1992)
(claiming that the UN Human Rights Committee is reluctant to consider the ques-
tion of self-determination). The Committee fears that states whose participation is
optional will withdraw their support. See id. Further, international law requires de-
fining a "people" when considering self-determination, requiring evaluation of
controversial and subjective topics of politics, anthropology and law. See id.
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and socioeconomic liberation, and not necessarily in terms of the quest
for statehood_61 Of course, such contexts illustrate that there is still
contestation over the breadth of the concept, " since states such as Aus-
tralia and the United States trace their very existence and perpetuation
to the denial of self-determination to the indigenous populations of the
lands which they now occupy.
So-called "internal" self-determination is an issue of increasing, al-
beit parallel, importance to the evolution and understanding of the con-
cept under consideration. 9 Nowhere is the ambivalence and sometimes
outright hostility of states more acutely reflected than in their response
to the self-determination of indigenous peoples and women and over
the question of secession.0 It is for this reason that the application of
the concept to minorities and indigenous peoples, as Manfred Nowak
points out, is by no means a settled issue."' The completion of a draft
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,", which is presently
doing the rounds of the various UN institutions," will hopefully project
67. See Ali Khan, Lessons From Afalcohn X:" Freedom by Any Means .Veces-
sary, 38 How. L.J. 29 (1994) (describing Malcolm X's dedication to advancing
self-determination for blacks in the US); see also Yussuf Kly. ..I/rican Americans
and Self-Detennination, 17 HAMLINE L. REv. 1,4-44 (1993) (discussing evolution
of self-determination from a search for statehood to a search for civil and human
rights); Elizabeth Pierce, Self-Determination for Native .4mericans: Land Rights
and the Utility of Domestic and International Laiw, 22 COLUNt. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
361 (1991) (analyzing the state of Native Americans and their need for increased
self-determination).
68. See Kirgis, supra note 2, at 305-06 (pointing out the inconsistencies in UN
documents about whether self-determination requires secession from a State).
69. See generally A.D. v. Canada, Communication No. 78,1980 (1984); Chief
Bernard Ominayah v. Canada, Communication No. 167/1984 (1990).
70. See Higgins, supra note 43, at 33 (stating that the right to secession is not
protected by international law and, therefore, international organizations do not
always pursue that avenue to self-determination).
71. See M. Nowak, The Right of Self-Deterinination and Protection olMinori-
ties in Central and Eastern Europe in Light of the Case-Law of tile Human Rights
Committee, 1 INT'L J. GRP. RTS. 7-8 (1993).
72. See Burger & Hunt, supra note 8, at 410-13 (providing authoritative text
and analysis of the Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples).
73. See Robert T. Coulter, The Draft Declaration on the Rights ofIndigenous
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the issue into more prominence in the future.74 State sovereignty will
obviously be the biggest impediment to the further development and• 71
extension of the right.
In the final analysis however, even for those, like Kurgis, who are
prepared to push the concept further, self-determination still retains an
overtly statist dimension. In other words, self-determination is em-
ployed primarily as a notion of state-determination, or (at best) of in-
ternal self-determination, which is principally designed to forestall a
more aggressive assertion of the right, and the possibility of its ultimateculmiationin .76
culmination in secession. There is no halfway house. To understand
why the majority of theorists and international law as a whole adopts
this view entails an examination of the nature of the state as we reach
the close of the twentieth century. To conduct such an examination, we
must revisit the premises upon which the notion of self-determination
is based beyond the "official story" recounted above. That analysis is
undertaken after considering the economic dimensions of self-
determination.
Peoples: What is It? What Does it Mean?, 13 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 123 (1995)
(providing an account and analysis of the Draft). The Draft was adopted by the UN
Sub-Commission of Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities on
August 26, 1994 and transmitted to the UN Commission on Human Rights. The
latter decided to create a new Working Group to meet annually to consider the
Draft Declaration and report to the Commission.
74. See id. at 131 (stating that indigenous peoples want the application of the
right of self-determination to be applied to the same extent as other peoples). Self-
determination includes freedom of self-government and control of each aspect of
society including freedom for the government from external countries, free legal
relationships with their government and foreign governments and control over their
own economic welfare. See id.
75. See Iorns, supra note 37, at 211 (stating that government representatives
support self-determination as long as it does not involve secession from the State).
76. See W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, The United Nations and the Protection of Individ-
ual and Group Rights, 47 INT'L SOC. SCI. J. 315, 317 (1995) (stating that self-
determination is a right every person holds). Self-determination is the right to gov-
ern one's self, yet it may only be claimed by those not governing. See id.; see also
Hanauer, supra note 2, at 133 (explaining that though there are many laws ensur-
ing the right of self-determination, it is still only a political ideal, and not a moral
ideal).
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B. ECONOMIC SELF-DETERMINATION: NOTES ON THE LIFE OF A
POOR SECOND COUSIN
1. Self-Determination and the ICESCR
The dominant discussions of economic self-determination normally
take as their point of departure the common appearance of an article on
self-determination in the International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR")77and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR")71 -the two human rights cove-
nants.79 Unfortunately, even when the discussion is extended to exam-
ine the implications of self-determination for human rights, the treat-
ment of economic, social, and cultural human rights is merely an
afterthought.0 In part, this treatment stems from the historic context in
which the two categories of rights covenants evolved and the attendant
belief that economic, social, and cultural rights were "Socialist" or
"Soviet" rights. 1 As such, they were dismissed as either unworthy of
consideration, "subversive," or defraying attention from the more im-
77. See G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter ICESCR].
78. See G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200A
(XXI) (1966) [hereinafter ICCPR] (setting forth civil and political rights for citi-
zens of nations that sign the non-binding agreement).
79. See Ions, supra note 37, at 281 (pointing out that the aspects relating the
pursuit of economic, social and cultural developments are often relegated to the
political dimension of the right). This discussion, though enlightening and one of
the few articles that attempts to deal comprehensively with the issue still suffers
from the same problem of emphasis by relegating the discussion to a section enti-
tled "Other Substantive Aspects of the Right of Self Determination" and only de-
votes 5 of the 60 pages in the article to this issue.
80. See James E. Falkowski, Secessiona.' SeIf-Deternination: 4 Jeffersonian
Perspective, 9 B.U. INT'L L.J. 209, 232-34 (discussing briefly the UN International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights).
81. See Chinken & Wright, supra note 4, at 295 (explaining that a split in per-
ceptions of rights occurred with the Western States embracing civil and political
rights and the Socialist States pursuing the rights of a reasonable standard of living,
employment, health care and education).
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portant and "real" civil and political rights. 2 This particularly Ameri-
can perception of economic, social, and cultural rights-a veritable
Cold War "hangover"-unfortunately continues to pervade intellectual
discussion and explains the dearth of attention to this category of hu-
man rights in comparison to the on-going fixation with civil and politi-
cal rights.
Although absent from the Universal Declaration,83 several statements
in the preamble can be taken to constitute a reference to an underlying
belief in the exercise of the right of self-determination. In fact, James
Falkowski asserts that Article 21, which concerns the right to take part
in government, is an implicit recognition of "the natural law principal
upon which self-determination is based."" Being conceptually fixated
with political self-determination, Falkowski typically overlooks Article
22, which states, in part, that everyone is "entitled to the realization,
through national effort and international cooperation and in accordance
with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, so-
cial and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free devel-
82. See Klabbers & Lefeber, supra note 50, at 42 (stating that it is justifiable to
focus on political aspects because such political self-determination serves as the
condition sine qua non for social, cultural and economic self-determination). But
see infra Part II.B.1 (explaining that focusing on the expansion of political rights is
not only reducing capacity to meet societal needs but is also causing a loss of
identity to minority societies).
83. See Ioms, supra note 37, at 249 (declaring that there was no general state-
ment on self-determination in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights because
the drafters could not agree on its formulation). The lack of a statement was pri-
marily due to the beginning of the Cold War.
84. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts.
Comm., Res. 217 A (III) Preamble para. 2 (1948) (implying a reference to eco-
nomic determination) [hereinafter Universal Declaration of Human Rights]. "Dis-
regard and contempt for human rights have resulted in ... the advent of a world in
which human beings shall enjoy freedom speech and belief and freedom from fear
and want . Id. "Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter
reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the
human person and in the equal rights of men and women and have determined to
promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom." Id. para. 5
(emphasis added).
85. Falkowski, supra note 80, at 228 (stating that self-determination is implic-
itly addressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights).
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opment of his personality."'' Together, these two articles are the pro-
genitors of the right of self-determination in international human rights
law, with Article 22 providing the basis for economic self-
determination.87 Given this background, it is worth analyzing more
deeply how economic self-determination has fared at the UN.
2. Revisiting the New International Economic Order and the Roots
of the "North/South " Divide
In the several decades that have passed since the second phase of
self-determination (decolonization), it has become clear that in primar-
ily focusing on the political aspects of colonialism (i.e. on the political
domination exercised over their territories), the anti-colonial national-
ists left out of the paradigm the extensive linkages that the system (as
an economic phenomenon) had created between colony and colo-
nized.8 Kwame Nkrumah's dictum to his colonized brethren and sis-
tren--"seek ye first the political kingdom'-was a serious underesti-
mation of what was actually involved. As Muranga points out in a
discussion of the African Economic Community:
these foreign powers that invaded Africa set goals for the continent based
on foreign interests. Africans could no longer determine their own fates
because their destinies had been placed in someone else's hands. It was at
this time that Africa was manipulated, programmed and specially pre-
pared to serve the colonial authorities as opposed to African domestic in-
terests. Gold Coast farmers for example, did not choose to produce cocoa
for export but were mandated. . . to do so by the British Crown. To make
money as a farmer in Gold Coast... one has no other option but to grow
90
cocoa.
86. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 84, art. 23.
87. See id. arts. 27-28 (granting the right to freely participate in the cultural life
of the community and entitlement to a social and international order in which the
rights and freedoms in the Declaration can be fully realized).
88. India and Vietnam are exceptional examples. However, the Cold War did
not allow for the adoption of "alternative paths" to become viable.
89. See JAMES MAYALL, NATIONALISM AND INTrERNATIONAL SOCIETY 116
(1990) (quoting Kwame Nkrumah's theory that by creating a stable political foun-
dation, economic and social modernization would inevitably follow). The theory is
"seek ye first the political kingdom, and all else will be added unto it." Id.
90. Theophilus F. Maranga, The Colonial Legacy and the African Common
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Accordingly, colonialism invested much more in the creation and
maintenance of the coercive instrumentalities of the state than it did in
social and economic amenities.9' Even under the relatively less virulent
forms of colonial control, such as that of the British, the proportion of
resources expended on law and order far exceeded that spent on educa-
tion, health, and social welfare combined.92 Despite claims about colo-
nial subventions to support the "White Man's Burden," as a matter of
fact, more resources were leaving the colonial enclaves than were
coming in.
Ultimately social, economic, and cultural rights remained a privilege
to be bestowed and withdrawn at the will of the colonial master.93 Such
realities explain the attention within the post-colonial African leader-
ship to social and economic issues, following the realization that the
"political kingdom" was in fact a hollow edifice of neocolonial control.
In fact, just before his overthrow, Nkrumah published an appropriate
mea culpa, with his famous tract-Neocolonialism.
94
Attention to economic self-determination within the framework of
the UN 9' actually pre-dates the ICESCR, although this is a fact not of-
ten recounted. Only three years following its establishment in 1945, the
UN set up the Economic Commission for Latin America ("ECLA"),
whose studies on trade, production and comparative advantage chal-
lenged the dominant Rostowian "take-off' models96 and brought the
Market: Problems and Challenges Facing the African Economic Community, 10
HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 105, 109 (describing the state of affairs in a powerful
country's colony in the 19th century).
91. See, e.g., WINSOME J. LESLIE, ZAIRE: CONTINUITY AND POLITICAL CHANGE
IN AN OPPRESSIVE STATE (1993) (setting forth an account of Belgium colonialism).
92. See, e.g., RAMKRISHNA MUKHERJEE, THE PROBLEM OF UGANDA: A STUDY
IN ACCULTURATION 180 (1956) (explaining that the British development fund was
established more to further ease exploitation of Uganda's resources and less to case
the British neglect of the basics of human welfare).
93. See generally Oloka-Onyango, supra note 19 (providing an overview of
Africa's colonization and its related problems).
94. See generally KWAME NKRUMAH, NEO-COLONIALISM, THE LAST STAGE OF
IMPERIALISM (1966) (explaining the neo-colonialism of Africa).
95. See Ofuatey-Kodjoe, supra note 2, at 363-67 (offering a history of the
UN's involvement in making self-determination a public interest).
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UN to the fore as the major forum for intellectual debate and contesta-
tion over the right to economic self-determination. v" Indeed, as Profes-
sor Smouts points out, development "gradually came to monopolize the
best part of the time, personnel, and resources of the United Nations.""
Two General Assembly resolutions in 1952 adverted to the issue of
permanent sovereignty over natural resources as a fundamental aspect
of the right of self-determination." In 1958, a Commission on Perma-
nent Sovereignty over Natural Resources was created.' " The Seventh
paragraph in the Preamble to the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to the Colonial Countries and People' "' states that "the
continued existence of colonialism prevents the development of eco-
nomic cooperation, impedes the social, cultural, and economic devel-
opment of dependent peoples and militates against the United Nations
ideal of universal peace."'02 The passing of the ICCPR and Optional
Protocol'03 in 1966 was followed by the Second United Nations Devel-
96. The Rostowian theory is based on the belief that over time the benefits of
economic development that naturally flow from international trade will eventually
filter through ("trickle down") to countries that are relatively less developed or dis-
advantaged by the international economy. It was a theory that came into vogue in
the 1950s and 1960s, and was reflective of the enthusiasm that greeted the spate of
independence of numerous countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The the-
ory has been largely discredited by the stark reality of continued marginalization
and impoverishment for those countries that were projected to "take off" under the
impetus of international trade.
97. See Marie-Claude Smouts, International Organizations and inequaliny
Among States, 47 INT'L SOC. Sci. J. 229, 236-38 (1995) (explaining that despite
other's efforts, the UN was the first international organization to successfully ad-
dress issues of human development).
98. Id. at 237.
99. See G.A. Res. 523, U.N. GAOR, 6th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/523 (VI)
(1952); see also G.A. Res. 626, U.N. GAOR, 7th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/626
(VII) (1952).
100. See G.A. Res. 1314, U.N. GAOR, 13th Sess. Doc. A/RES!1314 (XIII)
(1958) (establishing the Commission on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Re-
sources). The Commission was charged with the mandate to conduct an in depth
survey of the status of permanent sovereignty over natural wealth and resources as
a basic constituent of the right to self-determination. See id.
101. 1960 UN Declaration, supra note 44.
102. Id. para. 7.
103. See G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200A
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opment Decade'°4and its International Development Strategy, which led
to the Declaration on a NIEO.'5 While one may argue about its out-
come,1 there was no shortage of studies on the issue,0 7 and the debates
were sharply drawn, bringing into bold relief the "North/South"'0 8 di-
mensions to international contact that were to subsist to the present
time. Following the lull and setbacks of the 1980s, the issue of devel-
opment found a rebirth of sorts at the World Summit for Social Devel-
opment, held in Copenhagen in March 1995.' 09 On the face of it, eco-
nomic self-determination appears to have been as much a concern at
the UN as the political.
Unfortunately, there is a distinct pattern ascertainable in the forego-
ing developments, which demonstrates that the right to economic self-
determination still concentrated on states as the primary elements and
beneficiaries of that right,1 despite the clear reference to "peoples" in
(XXI) (1966).
104. See G.A. Res. 2626, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., U.N. Doe. A/RES/2626
(XXV) (1970).
105. See G.A. Res. 3201, U.N. GAOR, 6th Special Sess., Supp. No. I, U.N.
Doe. A/9559 (1974).
106. See Raul Ferero, The New International Economic Order and the Prono-
tion of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/24/Rev. 1 (1986) (offering
results of a study commissioned by and prepared for the UN).
107. See New International Economic Order: A Third World Perspective
(Pradip K. Ghosh ed., 1984) (analyzing the progress of the new international strat-
egy for the development of third world countries); Gabe Shawn Varges, The New
International Economic Order Legal Debate: Background, Status and Alternatives
(1983) (examining the content, development, and strategies of the New Interna-
tional Economic Order); Lars Anell & Birgittta Nygren, The Developing Countries
and the World Economic Order (1980) (providing an overview of the New Inter-
national Economic Order and suggesting possible ways for developing countries to
secure a larger share of the world's resources).
108. The "North/South" divide is both the geographic and economic division
between the industrialized developed economies and those that are basically sub-
sistent and less developed or "developing." Although there are certainly examples
of both types of economies in each geographical sphere, the divisions largely fol-
low the North/South pattern described.
109. See United Nations, Draft Declaration and Program of Action on the World
Summit for Social Development, A/Conf. 166/L. 1, Feb. 2, 1995.
110. See G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 31, at 50, U.N. Doc.
A/9631 (1974) (culminating in the promulgation of the Charter of Economic Rights
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the Covenants and other international instruments on the issue."' This
led to the parallel development-intermittently brought together in Te-
heran in 1968 '  and Vienna in 1993"'--of economic self-
determination and individual human rights. At the same time, however,
such developments did not lead to an improvement in the context of the
realization of the right to economic self-determination. Philip Alston
makes this point succinctly by stating that:
Whether one takes the number of resolutions adopted, the length and inci-
siveness of the relevant debates, the emphasis adopted in fact-finding, the
focus of the studies undertaken, the emphasis in the Advisory Services
Programme, the topics with which Fact Sheets and other forms of public
information have been concerned, or some other measure, economic, so-
cial and cultural rights continue to be very highly neglected or ignored.
This is not to deny the importance of the achievements that have been re-
corded, including especially, the creation of the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights in 1987.'"
The failure of the UN to develop a cogent and comprehensive ap-
proach to human rights and development illustrates how self-
determination across the board (of groups, individuals, peoples, and
minorities) is under threat from much more than the rise in ethnicity.""
and Duties of States).
111. See Ofuatey-Kodjoe, supra note 2, at 364-66 (discussing the beneficianes of
the right to permanent sovereignty over natural resources).
112. See Proclamation of Teheran, adopted at the International Conference on Hu-
man Rights, Teheran, Iran, May 13, 1968 (visited Oct. 23, 1999) <http://heiwwvw.
unige.ch/humanrtsfinstree/12ptichr.htm >.
113. See United Nations World Conference on Human Rights: 1 ienna Declaration
and Program ofAction, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 157/24 (Part I), Oct. 13, 1993, reprinted
in 32 1.L.M. 1661 (1993).
114. Philip Alston, Denial and Neglect, DEVELOPMENT: BUSINESS AND HuANLA
RIGHTS 111 (Richard Roech ed., 1993).
115. See Anthony Carty, From tie Right to Economic Self-Determination to the
Right to Development: A Crisis in Legal TheorY, cited in LAW AND DEVELOPMENrT
265 (Anthony Carty ed., 1992) (analyzing the tensions between human rights law and
self-determination). Carty argues that part of the problem lies in the reduction of the
legal principle of economic self-determination primarily into an ideological repre-
sentation. See id. As such, the concept:
has its roots in a Western tradition of legal voluntarism which cannot open the
way out to either national or international economic or social transformation.
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This threat extends to the core of humanity, and endangers individual
human existence as we know it."
16
Moreover, this failure on the part of the UN to acknowledge eco-
nomic self-determination has been juxtaposed to the unchallenged
dominance of the neo-classical application of monetarist philosophies
to development in the South,"7 the absence of a mechanism (akin to the
Optional Protocol under the ICCPR) of an individual complaints
mechanism under the ICESCR, and continuing international impotence
in the face of civil conflict and conflagration. These developments are
mirrored at the domestic level with the backlash against the welfare
state in the North, the emergence of restrictive and manifestly racist
immigration policies,"' and an overall attack against affirmative ac-
It restates the basic Western concept of 'subjective right' and applies it to the
state. In such a view of legal order, the basic structure of law is sub-
ject/property/contract .... The consequence is a language of state rights
which restricts attention to the authority and power of the state, without refer-
ence either to the nature of the international economy or to the needs and aspi-
rations of peoples.
Id.
116. See Chinkin and Wright, supra note 4, at 294 (discussing the tensions in hu-
man rights law and the meaning of self-determination). Nowhere was that threat more
dramatically illustrated than in the case of Somalia-a country absent the cleavages of
language, religion or ethnicity that have characterized the other "postmodernist" hot-
spots. See id. Chinkin and Wright mince no words in pointing to the culprit: First
world exploitation, massive arms sales, autocratic rule, the collapse of democratic in-
stitutions, and worsening economic conditions, compounded by environmental degra-
dation and drought, has driven Somalia to the point where it can no longer be de-
scribed as a viable political unit under international law." Id. But, there is more to the
story, "[i]t is ironic that the only solution to chaos and the starving deaths of millions
of Somalis ... is military intervention by the United States-the country which is
principally responsible for the arms build-up and the aberrant development that has
caused the present crisis." Id.
117. See Smouts, supra note 97, at 239 (stating that the major multicultural forums
"no longer serve as places where weak nations may challenge the more powerful.").
Smouts points out that, "[n]ot only have the forums that lent themselves to expres-
sions of anti-Western feeling and protest fallen silent, but also, since the end of the
cold war, with the [partial] exception of Cuba and North Korea, no state has objected
to the ideology of the free market economy and widespread free trade, and especially
not China." Id.
118. See generally J. Oloka-Onyango, The Plight of the Larger Haf." Human
Rights, Gender Violence and the Legal Status of Refugee and Internally Displaced
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tion," 9 the UN and multiculturalism.2: Collectively, what do all these
developments mean in terms of the right to self-determination? An at-
tempt is made in the following pages to provide some answers through
an overall critique of the dominant approaches to the doctrine.
II. SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE NOTION OF
STATEHOOD: A CRITICAL REVIEW
A. A SECOND LOOK AT SELF-DETERMINATION THEORY
The preceding overview of the official position on self-
determination allows us to commence a critical examination of both
the underlying premises upon which the right has developed within
intellectual analysis at the UN and in concrete practice. A number of
preliminary points need to be made to inform the discussion. Schol-
ars almost invariably commence their analyses of self-determination
with the Peace of Westphalia, or the Jeffersonian or Wilsonian as-
sertions that found normative expression in the United States Con-
stitution and in the Peace of Versailles respectively.
From whatever point in time theorists have retraced the concept of
self-determination, it has been drawn through the labyrinth of Western
history and development-from the Greco city-states to Westphalia, to
the French and American Revolutions, to the Wilsonian claim that
"[e]very territorial settlement involved in the First World War must be
made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned,
and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims
amongst rival states.' 2' The interesting point of both the descriptions
Women in Afiica, 24 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 349 (1996) (providing a critique of
international and regional law regarding refugee policy).
119. See CORNEL WEST, RACE MATTERS 47-68 (1993) (discussing the "'new black
conservatism").
120. See Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?. 72 FOREIGN AFF.
Summer 1993, 22 (exemplifying anti-multiculturalism and hypothesizing that the one
dominating source of conflict will be cultural rather than ideological or economic).
See generally SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE
REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER (1996) (responding to the debate on his earlier article in
the journal Foreign Affairs).
121. THOMAS A. BAILEY, WOODROW WILSON AND THE LOST PEACE 335 (1944)
(citing Address to the United States Congress by Woodrow Wilson on Feb. 11, 1918).
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and the application of self-determination in all of these instances, is the
omission of the parallel experience of self-determination of non-
Western peoples.'22 At the same time, very little discussion focuses on
the blinkers that marred the vision of each of these exemplars of West-
ern enlightenment.
Moreover, the so-called founding fathers of the right to self-
determination used that right to achieve their own freedom while pre-
venting others from asserting that very same right. In the twentieth
century rendition of the United States Constitution's eighteenth century
guarantee that "[a]ll men are created equal ... , " Native and African-
Americans hankered for freedom. In only one respect was the United
States Constitution true to its promise: it affirmed that all men had the
right to participate in government, thereby establishing the legal basis
for denying people of color and women the right to vote.
Accordingly, American leaders like Wilson left us with one conclu-
sion regarding the demand that the right of self-determination be rec-
ognized following both world wars: such demand for the right to self-
determination was simply the stirring of "Open-doorism," the phe-
nomenon pursued by the United States alongside the demand for inde-
pendence. In short, self-determination was the quest for more open
markets, and the removal of colonial monopolies, which constituted a
major impediment to that quest. Self-determination, in a nutshell, was
no more than the next logical stage to territorial imperialism.2
122. See, e.g. C.L.R. James, THE BLACK JACOBINS: TOUSSAINT L'OUVERTURE
AND THE SAN DOMINGO REVOLUTION (2d ed., rev. 1963). No theorist in the area
deigns to mention, to cite one example, the case of Toussaint L'Ouverture-the Hai-
tian General who defeated Napoleon's armies-and the invocation of the ideals of lib-
erty, freedom and self-determination deployed in that struggle: "[m]en make their own
history, and the black Jacobins of San Domingo were to make history which would
alter the fate of millions of men and shift the economic currents of three continents."
Id.
123. See Jason W. Clay, States, Nations and Resources: An Interdependent Rela-
tionship?, 19 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 11, 11-12 (1995) (claiming that states are
rarely created by those who are governed by them). Clay asserts that the states that
came into existence as a result of decolonization were essentially designed to per-
petuate colonial hegemony in a different form. He stated the following:
Colonial empires gave way to an obligatory international state system in
which the decolonized world had no choice but to adopt the centralized gov-
erning structures left behind by the colonial powers. Without the cost of
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The belief in the superiority of the Eurocentric models of interna-
tional law comes through even in the most radical scholarship, as the
following excerpt from an examination by David Kennedy of refugee
law so aptly illustrates:
European scholars, who wrote in the early era, did not distinguish inter-
national from municipal law, natural from positive law or the law which
binds sovereigns from that which binds citizens. Unlike those who wrote
subsequently about issues of world order, these early scholars did not
place a public sovereign at the center of their system. As a result, they did
not draw sharp contrasts between sovereigns and citizens and certainly
did not assimilate one to the other. Individuals were thought to exist
within a relatively unified legal structure, bound by law wherever they
found themselves geographically or bureaucratically. While away from
home one remained a human being subject to universal legal provisions
and owing allegiance to the sovereign in whose territory one found one-
self. The idea of losing protection of having to apply for a new protector
did not arise. Allegiance, in the sense of obedience, was owed to sover-
eigns, and although problems of conflicting allegiances to home and host
sovereign arose, the sharp boundaries of legal jurisdiction and sovereign
protection had not yet been developed.1:'
The essential point to note is that non-European experiences are
given short shrift-if mentioned at all. Such histories of international
law (in this instance refugee law) thereby simply omit-at the stroke of
a pen-centuries of the histories and experiences of nations and peo-
ples on the continents of the Americas, Africa, Asia, and Australia'
maintaining empires, the West was able to preserve global stability and a
dominant position in world trade. In essence, developed countries success-
fully sought trading partners who could ensure politically stable economic
systems and the free flow of goods.
Id. at 13.
124. David Kennedy, hIternational Refugee Protection, 8 HUM. RTS. Q. l, 23-24
(1986).
125. In an article that is noteworthy for its clarity, although still constrained by the
dominant focus, S. James Anaya argues that "[c]ore human rights values associated
with the concept of self-determination, however, clearly are not solely within the
province of the history of Western thought." See S. James Anaya, A Contemporar"
Definition of the International Norm of Self-Determination. 3 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBs. 131, 134 (1993) (citing Legal Consequenceslbr States of the Con-
tinued Presence of South Afr'ica in Namnibia (South West 4frica), 1971 I.C.J. 16, 31
(June 21, 1971) (discussing the character and scope of self-determination)). Citing
Justice Ammoun's concurring opinion in the Namnibia Case, Anaya points out that the
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Indeed, self-determination can be retraced to before the time that
Moses allegedly led the Israelites from Egypt. The quest for liberation,
and the desire to freely determine one's economic, social and political
life, is a sentiment intrinsic to all individuals and peoples. That theo-
retical analysis confines its discussion to the point in time when certain
(white) people arrange themselves in certain types of collectivities
(Euro nation-states) and not others, raises a number of questions. The
larger problem, of course, is that Western monopolization of the de-
bates directly results in a marginalization of alternative visions of soci-
ety. Nothing more clearly reveals that the UN's agenda is not simply
epistemological.' Scholars like Samuel Huntington are not simply
worried about the scourge of the "Other" (those of non-European de-
scent) abroad, but are concerned-along with so many of the spokes-
people for the ideologies of the political right-that this "Other" will
take over America. 1
7
The theoretical biases of Western scholars may not be of singular
importance to the present discussion, especially since the evolution
of the doctrine of self-determination has seen its greatest develop-
ment in more recent times. What is crucial, however, to both the
conceptualization and the present-day implementation of the right of
self-determination is that it continues to be pursued through the same
framework. That framework differs in no fundamental respect from
that presented as having its origins in Western thought and episte-
mology, namely, liberal conceptualizations of representative democ-
racy. Consequently, even though the debate moved in the 1960s to
focus on the self-determination of countries within a non-Western
context, it was couched within the framework of yet another Western
concept is both older than is usually asserted in the literature, and comprises two
streams of thought "established on the two opposite shores of the Mediterranean." Id.
126. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 120 (introducing the next pattern of conflict of
civilizations). Thus, for example, Samuel Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" resur-
rects the traditional fears of Western society being overrun and engulfed by the
"East," and the "South," but also repeats the oft-asserted view that the African culture
is not a "civilization." His "civilizations" include: "Western, Confucian, Japanese, Is-
lamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African civilization." Id.
at 25 (emphasis added).
127. See Samuel Huntington, If Not Civilizations, What? Paradigms of the Post-
Cold War World, 72 FOREIGN AFF. 186, Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 190 (wondering if the
"de-Westernization" of the United States will lead to "de-Americanization").
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phenomenon-colonialism-and biased towards the dominant
brands of international law-statehood.
As Rolf Knieper has stated, those movements which today try to
"[c]reate an Islamic or Jewish or Christian or Hindu State or one of
pure blood, do perhaps not know how much they are prisoners of
Eurocentric thought... .'"" In the movement to decolonize, the em-
phasis also focused on political self-determination, while resisting
the economic dimensions of that concept. In this way, self-
determination from colonial domination failed to address the experi-
ences of the new states before colonialism as well as those of the
various communities, peoples, and individuals who now comprised
them.' 29 In certain significant respects, the peoples of the former
colonized territories are today reaping the fruits of the truncated self-
determination of decolonization, just as the rigors of the same con-
ceptualization are being afflicted on the Balkans and the territory of
the former Soviet Union. Those fruits are the overt extension of a
Eurocentric vision of the world made in its own image."'
The implications of the application of such a Eurocentric frame-
128. ROLF KNiEPER, THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND
DEVELOPMENT (1992).
129. Before the MacMillan "winds of change" had blown across the length and
breadth of the continent, there were some attempts to examine the issue of the colonial
borders. According to Sam Blay:
In the late 1950s leading African nationalists appeared to have accepted that
this was desirable. In 1958, with less than ten independent states in Africa, the
All African Peoples Conference meeting in Accra denounced what was de-
scribed as "the artificial boundaries drawn by imperialist powers to divide
people of the same stock ... [the Conference subsequently called for the] ...
adjustment of such frontiers at an early date."
S.K. Blay, Changing African Perspectives on the Right of Self-Determination in the
Wake of the Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 29 J. APR. L. 147, 149
(1985). Klabbers and Lefeber deny that the conference had much legitimacy, or "in-
ternational legal value" because it was "a non-governmental conference of political
parties (thus by definition not empowered to create international legal rules), and apart
from that, at the time of its adoption only a few African states had attained their inde-
pendence." See Klabbers & Lefeber, supra note 50, at 57. Of course such a view is
overly state-centric, and dismisses the influence of nongovernmental actors on the
evolution of international legal principles. See id.
130. See wa Mutua, supra note 6, at 1175 (recognizing that Europe's involvement
in Africa has "only brought misery").
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work of analysis are acutely manifest in the case of African-
Americans and other people of color in the United States. Under Jef-
fersonian self-determination, African-Americans never merited at-
tention.'3' Instead, their gift was a Supreme Court-sanctified slap in
the face that confirmed that what was separate was also unequal." '
The Wilsonian doctrine was applicable to the minorities of reconsti-
tuted Europe, but not to the diasporan minorities of "liberated"
America. Decolonization applied to Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean,
but never reached American shores. Is it a surprise that African-
Americans today experience an acute sense of alienation?' As
Henry Richardson states:
the totality of African-American interests under international law, in-
cluding sufficient representation of important individual interests, cannot
be adequately achieved under restrictive interpretations of the rights of
peoples encapsulated in national states. The self-determination rights of
African-Americans are sufficiently wide to give them the right to partici-
pate-even as, in a factual sense, they are inescapably a participant-in
the international law process and to make claims involving the full scope
of rights, obligations and policies encompassed by international law."
4
There is, however, another dimension to the analysis. The significa-
tion of the movement from natural law to positivism coincided with the
transformation of capitalism and the entrenchment of that ethnocentric
moment in history which spurred the modem day crusades-the
"flight" of the missionaries-and the consequent termination of the in-
dependence of the vast majority of non-Western peoples. Imbued in the
131. See Falkowski, supra note 80, at 237 (arguing also that the United States im-
plies that Native-Americans are unable to govern themselves by acting as their trustee,
and consequently exclude Native-Americans from representing their race in interna-
tional organizations, such as the UN).
132. See generally Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
133. See Henry J. Richardson, Gulf Crisis and African-American Interests under
International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 42 (1993) (arguing that African-Americans see
the "critical moment" arising from "Operation Desert Storm" differently than other
American citizens). Richardson makes the point that today in the United States "there
is now considerable and widespread, though not total, alienation among African-
Americans from the majority of political and judicial leaders of the country, especially
in the executive and the Supreme Court." Id. at 59.
134. Id. at48.
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spirit of the nation-state, scholars and missionaries alike could envisage
no alternative to the single God (in a heaven situated above earth) and
no alternative to the hierarchical, ostensibly monolithic, and dominant
Euro-nation state.'35
Given such limitations, it is necessary to examine the full parameters
of the underlying premises of theoretical discourse on the doctrine of
self-determination before making any conclusions about its continuing
applicability.
1. Ideology as Praxis: The hnpact of Self-Determination as a
Western Construct
The preceding points can be better understood if we simply take a
few examples of societal organization before the onslaught of Western
imperialism. Isabelle Gunning discusses societal organization through
an analysis of refugee law that draws much inspiration from an exami-
nation of pre-colonial African social formations."' One corollary to the
creation of the Western nation-state was that the individual was denied
a juridical identity in relation to the political divisions entailed by na-
tion-statehood.'37 People who identified with a state and its territory
were presumed to be "protected" by the state even while away from
it.
138
By contrast, the African conception of the ideas of "'person," "self,"
and "statehood" was different-a difference reflected in part in the
definition latterly adopted by the 1969 Organization of African Unity
135. See Kennedy, supra note 124, at 24 (noting the radical change the opinion of
jurists underwent with the rise of positivism). Kennedy states:
The sovereign was the center of the legal structure. In addition, municipal and
international as well as positive and natural law were sharply distinguished. In
the era of high positivism, nothing could be more different than the respective
situations of citizens and sovereigns. Individuals. for purposes of international
law, were more or less fully assimilated to sovereigns who, it was thought,
gave them "nationality" and "protection."
Id.
136. See Isabelle R. Gunning, Erpanding thre hIteniational Defliition of Refitgee: A
Multicultural View, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 35 (1989-90).
137. See id. (discussing the European concept of the "nation-state").
138. See id. (providing a comparison indicating that a state owes no duty to people
who left the state if these people cannot identify with the state).
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("OAU") Convention on Refugees,'" and in the 1981 Banjul Charter
which incorporated self-determination as a right of individual human
beings and peoples. 4 ' Gunning summarizes the difference in the fol-
lowing way: "[w]hile territory, itself, has been sometimes jealously
guarded, people have not been associated with a territory to the extent
they have been in European experiences. African history is a product of
community relationships that are not territorially based."' 4, Gunning
continues to point out that studies of the nomadic Fulani "have shown
that their 'disrespect' for territorial borders did not make them 'aliens'
within the communities in which they interacted; [r]ather, the Fulani,
who moved to the Central Sudan as part of their customary search for
pastures, by 1804 had come to be regarded as equal citizens of that re-
gion" as well. 42 In fact:
In African history, where territorial boundaries were much more fluid
than in the traditional nation-state construct, nomads were not mere visi-
tors to the communities through which they traveled. Often times the no-
mads' herds were essential to the economic life of these communities and
the nomads would also participate in the political life of their communi-
ties. The responsibility of the government to the individual, then, tran-
scended territorial borders.'
One of the great ironies of history is that the Fulani (and hundreds
of other groups and communities) were forced, by the creation of a
nation-state under the colonial model, to choose between citizenship
of Mali, Chad, the Congo, or the Sudan, a decision that sometimes
rendered them a minority (without juridical rights) whereas previ-
ously they had enjoyed such rights.'" And yet, pursued to its logical
139. See OA U Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in
Africa, concluded at Addis Ababa, Sept. 10, 1969, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45 (1976) (provid-
ing the test of the convention).
140. See Blay, supra note 129.
141. Gunning, supra note 136, at 73-74.
142. Id. at 74.
143. Id. at 74-75.
144. Western scholarship generally elicits a complete lack of comprehension for
this peripatetic element among some African peoples. Hanauer, for example, speaks
of the Sahrawhi peoples of Western Sahara as "unwittingly crossing internationally-
recognized borders .... See Hanauer, supra note 2, at 134 (discussing the problems
of peoples who have no officially recognized state),
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conclusion, the spirit of the Refugee Convention that is derived from
the African notion that I am my brother's (and sister's) keeper",
would essentially eliminate the constraining doctrine of uti pos-
sidetis. At a minimum, it would inform refugee policy and practice
elsewhere, particularly in the xenophobic North. The African notion
would also enhance the rights to self-determination of this category of
marginalized individuals. In sum, an alternative vision, recognizing
the right of movement as essential to the right of self-determination,
would have produced a very different application of the concept un-
der discussion. "' Unfortunately, with a conceptualization fixated
with territory, it is of little surprise that the issue of the scope of the
right to self-determination has so vexed and confused the UN.
The parallel dimension of the self-determination question must not
be forgotten, namely, the self-determination of groups such as
women, children, and a variety of social and political minorities who
have attempted to claim the right, either by exercising autonomy or
by seeking greater accommodation within the construct of the state.
Curiously, only a handful of the literature speaks to this aspect of
self-determination. In fact, almost none of the literature mentions the
gender-specific elements that comprise twentieth century self-
determination theory and practice, and it is important to understand
why such a gap in the literature exists.
2. Feminism, Gender, and Women in Theories of the State and Self-
Determination
The theoretical development and application of the doctrine of
145. See generally Makau wa Mutua, The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural
Fingerprint. An Evaluation of the Language of Duties, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 339, 359-64
(discussing a wide-ranging and forcefully argued synopsis of the various dimensions
to the African conception of solidarity).
146. See Shashi Tharoor, The Universality of Human Rights and the Relevance
to Developing Countries, 60 NORDIc J. INT'L L. 139, 14243 (1991) (paraphrasing
John Mbiti and Niara Sudarkasa in pointing out how the philosophy of existence in
Africa is "I am because we are, and because we are therefore I am."). Tharoor
notes that identity in the African context goes beyond the nuclear family. The Afri-
can structure entails a more complex set of communal entitlements and obligations
grouped around respect, restraint, responsibility, and reciprocity. See id. Regard-
less of the idea, there have been insufficient attempts to listen to these contending
voices. See id.
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self-determination, like statehood,' 7 sovereignty,' 4 and even human
rights, 49 have completely skirted the gender dimensions inherent in
the doctrine."" Accordingly, the state itself is hostile to women and
their autonomous existence within domestic fora'"' and such biases
are transferred onto the international scene, often with a vengeance.
One such instance can clearly be discerned in the transmutation of
the rape phenomenon. For centuries, rape has been a fundamental as-
pect of the political economy of women's subordination, but has
never been accorded the seriousness, weight, or moral abhorrence
that it obviously entails."'2
Rape, although an intrinsic part of war, was traditionally dismissed
alongside the takings of the other "spoils" of war, with neither men-
tion nor redress for the individual victims. The horrors of recent
years, however, have projected attention to the issue of rape in war
onto the international agenda, largely on account of forceful inter-
vention of women's human rights activists in the issue.'' Notwith-
standing, the traditional position on rape is grounded both in the eth-
nocentric and sexist evolution of Western society and philosophy, as
147. See generally Shelley Wright, Economic Rights, Social Justice and the
State: A Feminist Reappraisal, in RECONCEIVING REALITY: WOMEN AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 25 (Dorinder G. Dallmeyer ed., 1993) (defining "statehood"
as an international term of open texture).
148. See Sandra Whitworth, Theory as Exclusion: Gender and International
Political Economy, in POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE CHANGING GLOBAL ORDER
116 (Richard Stubbs & Geoffrey Underhill eds., 1994).
149. See Celina Romany, Women as Aliens: A Feminist Critique of the Pub-
lic/Private Distinction in International Human Rights Law, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J.
87 (1993) (condemning the human rights framework for blending the public life
with the private sphere of familial relationships).
150. See Charlesworth & Chinkin, supra note 4, at 73 (noting how women's
struggle for self-determination is invalidated in the context of a collective right).
151. See Linda S. Greene, Feminism, Law and Social Change: Some Re/lections
on Unrealized Possibilities, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 1260 (1993) (using the
empowerment perspective to transcend the isolated social phenomenon).
152. See Rhonda Copelon, Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domes-
tic Violence as Torture, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291 (1994) (arguing that
rape in domestic partner abuse is a type of torture).
153. See Oloka-Onyango, supra note 118, at 349 (noting the insensitivity of Af-
rican human rights to the plight of refugee and internally displaced women).
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well as in the twentieth century dominance of patriarchal forms of
organization throughout the world.'" The imposition of a develop-
ment and statehood model by Western society is simply the recrea-
tion of the rest of the world in its own image.'" Additionally, rela-
tions between the sexes has also significantly influenced the structure
of Western society and the conceptualization of self-determination,
or the absence of a need for its precise legalistic articulation.'"
In an analysis of the nature of relations in an indigenous (so-called
"native") American community before the onslaught of colonialism,
Eleanor Leacock 5 7 remarks importantly that although the hierarchical
perspective of the roles of men and women suits this ethnocentric
paradigm perfectly, defining gender roles is a global practice and is
not always indicative of superiority or inferiority. Leacock continues
by stating that the anthropologist rarely contemplates the possibility
that women and men could be separate but equal. In fact, even the
term "tribe," meaning a territorially bounded and politically con-
trolled entity, is merely the spawn of colonial relations, deliberately
separating "public male authority" from "private female influence,"
154. See Hilary Charlesworth, Human Rights as Men' s Rights. in WOMEN'S
RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 103 (Julie Pe-
ters & Andrea Wolper eds., 1995) (arguing that the current international human
rights structure is male-dominated and thus creates obstacles to the advancement of
women).
155. See Andrea Bear Nicholas, Colonialism and the Struggle .6r Liberation:
The Experience of Maliseet Women, 43 U. N.B. L.J./REVUE DE DROIT DE L'UN-B
223, 227-28 (1994) (attributing the change in Maliseet society from a dispersed
system of decision-making that included women to a centralized system that ex-
cluded women to Western colonial influences). Nicholas documents the astonish-
ment a French missionary experienced on a visit to an Indian pre-colonial settle-
ment in the Americas: "What was most astounding and alien to him was the
egalitarianism, the high degree of harmony and personal autonomy, and the con-
comitant dispersed nature of decision-making among both men and women
Id. at 227.
156. See id. at 227 (remarking how leadership roles were relative). "Leadership
arose out of personal influence, and only for as long as a task required it. It was
decidedly not dependent on the power to force compliance by giving or withhold-
ing resources, as in the European sense." Id.
157. See id. at 224, 228 (quoting Eleanor Leacock, who studied the Innus Indi-
ans, a tribe very similar to the Maliseet, and based her wvriting on the writings of
Paul Le Jeune, a Jesuit Priest who lived among the Innus).
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and labeling the separation of resultant hierarchy as universal. 5' Lea-
cock concludes that society has "models of development that move
from band to tribe to chiefdom to state, all related to a movement
from dispersed decision-making to the western ideal of centralized
power and authority."'5'9
The principal international instrument characterizing statehood in
international law, the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Du-
ties of States,60 clearly maps the above stipulations. Theories of
statehood have essentially taken the attributes listed in the Conven-
tion as a given and have paid little attention to the contradictions that
such a position entails when placed alongside a holistic analysis of
various aspects of international law."6'
Faced with such analyses, feminist scholarship 6 ' has critiqued
prevailing analyses of the state as flawed because they take the state
as a given and essentially monolithic entity. It is apparent in the fi-
nal analysis that the state in its present form cannot provide the basis
upon which a serious and liberating feminist agenda for self-
determination can be prosecuted. Such a construction of statehood is
158. See id. (quoting Eleanor Leacock and her comments on the flimsy notion of
"separate but equal" between the genders).
159. See id. at 228 (discussing the paradigmatic shifts toward Western ideals of
power and authority).
160. See Convention on Rights and Duties of States, 49 Stat. 3097 (1933)
[hereinafter Convention].
161. See id. art. 1 (asserting that statehood is confirmed through the possession
of a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and the capacity to
enter into relations with other states).
162. See e.g., J. Ann Tickner, Foreword to GENDERED STATES: FEMINIST (RE)
VISIONS OF INTERNATIONAL THEORY ix (V. Spike Peterson ed., 1992) (contending
that such analyses ignore the fact that states are quite different, that there is a need
to explore the politics of state action, and that they "ahistorically project an image
of the present back onto the past").
163. See Knop, supra note 4, at 154 (noting statehood's independence). As
Knop points out, if defined by exploring the politics of state action and projecting
the present onto the past, statehood would in no way depend on whether the state
observes human rights, including women's rights; or whether it represents the
population, judging by liberal, feminist, or other criteria or representation. See id.
A regime that grossly violates women's rights can be recognized as a state and can
participate in the creation of international law. See id.
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positively inimical to the self-determination of women. Given such a
framework, one must also wonder whether the increased presence of
women per se within such a gendered structure would fundamentally
transform the situation of women's domination and subordination.'t
Such a question suggests the need for a review not only of the basic
premises upon which principles of the rule of law (both domestic and
international) are constituted, but also of the fashion in which society
is organized. Given the above factors, it is of little surprise that male-
dominated perceptions of statehood and international law have not
spared the right of self-determination from their ambit.i"
In light of the foregoing, the doctrine of self-determination must
be reconstituted so that it does not simply take "the group" (or "the
state") as a given. Indeed, the exact content and application of the
doctrine of self-determination must be revisited and reconceptualized
as a whole. 66 Mere critique of the dominant perspectives of the state
is unsatisfactory.' 67 Women have a radical claim to entitlement.'
164. See generally SANDRA HARDING, WHO'S SCIENCE? WHO'S KNOWLEDGE?:
THINKING FROM WOMEN'S LIVES (1991) (arguing that tie increased presence of
women within the gendered structure has a minimal effect on women's subordina-
tion); IRIS YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 200 (Princeton Press
Univ. ed., 1990) (same).
165. See Charlesworth & Chinkin, supra note 4, at 73 (noting the paradox be-
tween free choice and the validity of women's self-determination). According to
Charlesworth and Chinkin:
[t]he problematic structure of traditionally asserted JUS COGENS norms is also
shown in the more controversial 'collective' right to self-determination. The
right allows 'all peoples' to 'freely' determine their political status and freely
pursue their economic, social and cultural development. Yet the oppression of
women within groups claiming the right of self-determination has never been
considered relevant to the validity of their claim or to the form self-
determination should take.
Id. at73.
166. See Chinkin & Wright, supra note 4, at 263 (examining and reconceptual-
izing self-determination with the concept and culture of food).
167. See Knop, supra note 4, at 158 (suggesting ways in which the doctrine can
be challenged and effectively transformed).
168. See id. at 159 (defining the radical claim of entitlement of women). Knop
explains this claim of women as: "A recognition as limited subjects of international
law with the right to participate directly in the formulation of international and re-
gional norms of particular concern to them and, the right to direct recourse to
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Knop and Richardson arrive at the same conclusion with respect to
African-Americans.
In sum, the issue of women's self-determination needs to be taken
to a higher level. We must ensure, however, that an exercise such as
the one Knop suggests does not simply degenerate into a duplication
of both the hierarchical models of representation that currently
dominate the international scene and the masculine construction of
statehood. In other words, any such reconceptualization must also
ensure that the varied interests of the full range of women-not sim-
ply middle-class, white, Western women69-are taken into ac-
count. ° The failure to do so would basically amount to a return to
the point from which the struggle commenced, namely, continuing
Western hegemony with a "feminist" face.'7 ' The same caveat obvi-
ously applies to the struggles by African-Americans and other people
of color.
In short, we need to conduct inquiries addressing a number of
questions: who is involved in the development of self-determination,
what is the nature of involvement, and who benefits from such in-
global and regional mechanisms to protect their rights." Id.
169. This was a problem, for instance, when white and Aboriginal women
clashed over the inclusion of Aboriginal men in their struggles against the suppres-
sion of their rights by white men. For an account of the foregoing, see Ann
Curthoys, Citizenship, Race, and Gender: Changing Debates over the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples and the Rights of Women, in Suffrage and Beyond, in
INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 102-03 (Caroline Daley & Melanie Nola
eds., 1994) (noting how Aboriginal women and their culture were rooted in coloni-
zation, orientalization, and racism).
170. Such a need cannot be over-emphasized, particularly on account of the ten-
dency-even within feminism-of Western structures seeking to dominate and
control the discourse and the agenda. See J. Oloka-Onyango & S. Tamale, "The
Personal is Political, " or Why Women's Rights Are Indeed Human Rights: An Af-
rican Perspective on International Feminism, 17 HUM. RTS. Q. 691 (1995) (dis-
cussing the contradictions of Western feminism and its relationship with other, es-
pecially African, communities).
171. See generally Adetoun Ilumoka, African Women's Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, Toward a Relevant Theory and Practice, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF
WOMEN: NATIONAL & INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 320 (Rebecca Cook ed.,
1994).
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volvement?' 72 Knop's formulation would still be inadequate unless it
is also married to a holistic conception of self-determination, a con-
ception that considers both the political, and the socioeconomic and
cultural facets of the phenomenon."' This is particularly necessary in
light of the fact that women have been historically marginalized, and
suffer disproportionately from the relegation of this category of
rights to a second-class level.17 Moreover, self-determination has
suffered from the same theoretical problems that have plagued liberal
concepts such as freedom, choice, and autonomy, which "impose a
particular kind of order, a structure that violently suppresses those
details that do not fit-in particular, the details surrounding the per-
sistent domination of men over women, rich over poor, and whites
over blacks. '' 7s As Razack points out, in our conceptualization of
such notions, unless we come to terms with covert regulation and
with power as an effect, we will be unable to determine who is being
oppressed and what should be done about it:
Oppression in liberalism, means the imposition of unjust constraints...
[w]hen one departs from the notion of choice and freedom ... and comes
to see power as a net organizing how individuals are constituted in any
one context, oppression becomes a story of struggle and submission, of
how what is present is made possible by what is absent.''
For women, the foregoing point is of particular relevance, both in
the sense of external and internal self-determination and can only be
understood by examining the structure of relationships in concrete
terms and not through abstract notions.'- Unfortunately, the domi-
172. See Linda Mayouz, Beyond Naivet: Women, Gender Inequality and Par-
ticipatomT Development, 26 DEv. & CHANGE 235. 251 (1995) (examining the same
issue with respect to women's participation in development projects).
173. See Oloka-Onyango, supra note 118. at 94 (analyzing the need to both re-
conceptualize and reinvigorate attention to this category of rights).
174. See Charlesworth & Chinkin, supra note 4, at 69 (distinguishing between
public and private dichotomy).
175. See Sherene Razack, Collective Rights and Women: 'The Cold Game of
Equality Sharing,' in Group Right 66, 72 (Judith Baker ed., 1994) (explaining also
fundamental collective rights as "seeing" and "not seeing").
176. Id. at 72.
177. See generally Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Rights as Relationship, 1
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nant trends in both international legal theory and in the application of
economic self-determination do not appear to strengthen such possi-
bilities. To illustrate this assertion, this Essay concludes by examin-
ing how the political economy of the late twentieth century is the
single most important factor now influencing the fashion in which
concepts such as statehood, sovereignty, development, and ulti-
mately, self-determination, are evolving as we proceed toward the
next millennium. These developments do not bode well for the future
prospects of democracy.
B. TOWARD HOLISTIC CONCEPTIONS OF SELF-DETERMINATION
1. Back to the Future: Twenty-First Century "Statehood" and Its
Implications
Current scholarship is caught between deciding whether we have
arrived at the "end" of the nation-state or whether the state is at its
epitome.17 1 Whatever one concludes, a consensus appears to be
emerging that the state has undergone a considerable metamorphosis
even within the space of the last decade of the century.'79 Rather than
focusing on the state as such, it might, for the moment, be more use-
ful to examine those elements outside of the state in order to arrive at
a comprehensive consideration of their impact on the phenomenon of
statehood.'80 No other more prominent non-state actors exist today
than international businesses in alliance with multilateral finance. In
an insightful, albeit ethnocentric analysis of the decline of the nation-
REv. CONST. STUD. 1 (1993).
178. See Ahmednasir M. Abdullahi, The Refugee Crisis in Africa as a Crisis of
the Institutions of the State, 6 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 562 (1994) (supporting the
"death-to-the-state" position and noting state failures in Somalia and Liberia). See
generally Jjuuko, supra note 6; wa Mutua supra note 6; Strange, infra note 187
(discussing "end-of-the-state" theories).
179. See Jjuuko, supra note 6, at I (examining the dwindling role of the state in
the economy and in the provision of basic social services).
180. A number of these can be usefully identified, although they would have to
be more critically examined elsewhere. They include nongovernmental organiza-
tions, guerilla movements, multilateral development and finance institutions, and
transnational corporations.
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state, "'81 Vivien Schmidt argues that the eclipse of the state has been
marked by the concomitant emergence of business as the dominant
world force.182 As a consequence, this rise in international business
has dwarfed traditional sovereignty and has created additional prob-
lems.113 While international business has greatly strengthened trans-
national corporations, it has also marginalized the state with consid-
erable implications for society at large:
By liberalizing their trade policies, by deregulating their economies, and
by privatizing their enterprises, national governments have much less
control over what goes on in their own territory or what their multination-
als do elsewhere, and they no longer have the resources they had in the
past to solve social problems. At the same time, multinational corpora-
tions are less bound economically, politically, and morally to nation-
states, while supranational bodies such as GATT, NAFTA, and the EU,
by concentrating on trade have given scant attention to the social spill-
184
overs.
Schmidt explains that deliberative democracy will suffer as a re-
sult of the changes wreaked by the new economic world order, de-
pending upon a nation's particular characteristics. ' 5 Overall, Schmidt
argues that "democracy is at risk,"' ' and with good reason. The po-
181. The supra-national arrangements of most concern to Schmidt are the
NAFTA and the EU (and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT')/World Trade Organization ("WTO") to a lesser extent). Even though
she refers to the decline of the "Nation-State," it is clear that her parameters are
limited to only a few. The specific countries she analyzes in greater depth include:
the "smaller" European countries (i.e., the Netherlands, Belgium), and Sweden,
Austria, Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and the United States.
Needless to say, many of the effects she speaks of directly affect the phenomenon
of statehood in non-Western or industrialized contexts, and indeed with significant
repercussions, especially since the peoples of such countries have not received the
benefits of "a larger market, higher standards, better protections for all citizens of
the EU, and greater economic stability."
182. See generally Schmidt, supra note 6.
183. See id. at 75 (pointing out that "[c]apital has become increasingly mobile
and business increasingly international as borders that act as barriers to trade fall
and as regulations that constrain commerce are lifted.").
184. Id. at 76-77.
185. See id. at 77.
186. Id.
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litical implications are evident in terms of traditional civic and politi-
cal exercises like voting, political associations, freedom (and capac-
ity) of expression, and even movement, which are all fundamental to
the right of self-determination.1
7
In addition, there are serious problems for the realization of eco-
nomic self-determination, considered in the two dimensions of its
manifestation under international law, viz., control over natural re-
sources, and the individual realization of economic, social, and cultural
rights. These include rights to education, health, shelter, and an ade-
quate standard of living and food. In the North, this has meant a dimi-
nution in the largesse of the welfare state, a process facilitated in the
United States by a Republican Congress infused with Gingrichian po-
litical and economic theory, and by the implementation of the North
American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA").8 " Elsewhere-even in
states that hitherto prided themselves on being able to meet the welfare
necessities of the poor, such as Sweden and Germany-such tradition-
ally assumed economic and social guarantees (of a job, health care, or
an adequate living standard) are rapidly deteriorating. Schmidt points
to the German experience as an illustration that:
187. See Susan Strange, The Defective State, 124 DAEDALUS 55, 56 (1995)
(pointing out that profound damage is being afflicted upon the state). She writes:
"The proposition in short, is that state authority has leaked away, upwards, side-
ways, and downwards. In some matters, it seems even to have gone nowhere, just
evaporated. The realm of anarchy in society and economy has become more exten-
sive as that of all kinds of authority has diminished." Id. at 56. Strange writes:
States are obliged by structural change to seek commercial allies rather than
military ones. Some of these allies will be other states in regional economic
associations. Others will be foreign-owned firns. And the agendas for inter-
state discussion and bargaining are also changing, as are the issues arising in
domestic politics.
Id.
188. See Jill Hills, Dependency Theoiy and its Relevance Today: International
Institutions in Telecommunications and Structural Power, 20 REv. INT'L STUD.
169, 174 (1994) (asserting that international financial liberalization, led by the
United States, produced a "tightening of credit and shortage of capital" which
contributed to the recession of the early 1990s). This, in turn, increased protec-
tionism, as well as greater exports from industrialized countries, which, when
combined with a drop on commodity prices, led to a trade imbalance for the
world's poorest nations, thus undermining their attempts at autonomy. See id.
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Even multinationals from countries such as Germany, where corporations
have traditionally felt a social obligation to the community in which they
operate, have increasingly been relocating with an eye to lower taxes and
wages. And whether they stay or move, multinationals successfully use
their mobility to pressure workers and gain wage concessions."'
The aforementioned developments, however, not only have eco-
nomic or political implications; they affect policies on immigration as
well as the perception of people of color, both in the popular medium
and in the domain of public discourse. Such people, in both the North
and South, are beginning to share their experiences as well as their
complexions: they too are being dispossessed-socially, politically and
economically.
These processes are being perversely duplicated at the international
level. While the UN of the 1960s had been subsumed by the idea of
development, this is no longer the case.'" Now, the organization's very
existence is a more pressing concern. Smouts contends that despite a
profusion of international institutions, multilateralism is suffering."'
What prevails instead is a kind of "collective bilateralism," with each
state applying "individually to the donor countries, which, for their
part, form a group ... [t]he disproportion is alarming.-'" Accordingly,
business is the only institution that emerges strengthened.
Business generally has become stronger, more independent and mobile,
and less in need of the close relationships with government or of the com-
promises with labor that it had developed throughout the postwar years.
Labor, by contrast, has become weaker with respect to business at the
same time that it has increasingly been shut out of policy-making proc-
189. See Schmidt, supra note 6, at 79 (describing how the global organization of
multinational corporations led them to defy any characterization or sense of obli-
gation based on national origin).
190. See BOUTROs BOUTROS-GHALI, AGENDA FOR PEACE 6 (1995) (asserting
that many modem conflicts arise, not from military threats between states, but
from claims of nationalism and sovereignty, as wvell as from ethnic, religious, so-
cial, cultural, and linguistic despair).
191. See Smouts, supra note 97, at 240 (explaining that some states, such as
those in Eastern Europe and Africa, do not have access to a forum where they can
properly address their grievances with international financial institutions).
192. See id. (illustrating the imbalance between the financial donors and the recipi-
ents).
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esses by liberalizing governments.'93
The ultimate result of business' growing influence is that "societal
interests, with the exception of business interests, have less access to
decision-making at the national level, let alone at the supranational
level.' 94 Further, "as national governments continue to deregulate and
privatize, to reduce taxes and to diminish their own control over eco-
nomic policies generally, they have increasingly less capacity to meet
societal needs in the face of economic downturn, especially in such ar-
eas as employment and social welfare."'95 Those interests and needs
which are marginalized become correspondingly a "potentially disrup-
tive force."'96
If the foregoing is indicative of the situation in the North, then the
situation in the South is even more disturbing. Under the yoke of
SAPs, Paris and London Club Rescheduling, and the quest for a
greater return on investments, developing countries are at their most
vulnerable since independence.' 97 Even if political self-determination
is assured, the absence of economic self-determination creates the
possibility of its eventual forfeiture. In symbolic terms, the high
point of the marginalization process was the capitulation of India to
the dictates of the neoclassical economics of the market-India,
which, even more than China, was long perceived as the lone Third
World country holding out in stoic-if naive-resistance.' "8
There is yet an additional (and more ominous) dimension to this
marginalization. As Adekanye points out, there is a close link between
the rise of the ethnic tensions that often fuel demands for self-
193. See Schmidt, supra note 6, at 86 (suggesting that, due to outside economic
pressures, there is a growing imbalance between business and labor influence).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See id. (asserting that any societal interests that the government ignores as a
result of privatization will become disillusioned, thus disrupting the stability of
state sovereignty).
197. See id. at 90 (noting how European integration has disrupted France's "sta-
tist" pattern of policy-making).
198. See generally TARIQ ALl, AN INDIAN DYNASTY: THE STORY OF THE
NEHRU-GANDHI FAMILY (1989) (providing an account of India's resistance
movement and the family who led it).
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determination and secession on the one hand, and the increasing eco-
nomic disenfranchisement of the masses on the other.'" Even as tech-
nological advancement (via the information super-highway) reaches
unparalleled levels of sophistication and access, the rate of disenfran-
chisement grows apace.
Much of the responsibility for this situation lies with the despotic
leaders who pillaged and plundered the coffers of public financial in-
stitutions and economic enterprises until they drained them dry. How-
ever, during the Cold War, external sponsors assisted these leaders in
their endeavors. Despite the fact that institutions like the World Bank
and the IMF have admitted that their past mismanagement contributed
to the current crises,' neither have attempted to atone for their mis-
takes through reparations.0' Concurrently, there is a direct link to the
resulting austere measures that are being imposed with scant atten-
tion to the creation of social supports for those on the margins of so-
ciety. Adekanye argues that:
the international community has not yet made the logical and necessary
connections which would permit it to recognize that the very programmes
and activities of some of its agencies in Africa, particularly the IMF and
the World Bank, may be one of the factors encouraging these tensions
.... One of the implications of the foregoing analysis is that since ethnic
and regional tensions have been rising due to the conditions created by
debts, economic crisis and adjustment, no strategy of conflict resolution
will prove adequate and sustainable unless it tackles these underlying
conditions. 2
This means that the concept of self-determination-both economic
and political-may be under less attack than it appears from the more
199. See Adekanye, supra note 181, at 371 (asserting that demands for democra-
tization and coinciding ethnic tensions combine to intensify the struggle against the
State itself).
200. See WORLD BANK, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: FROM CRISIS TO SUSTAINABLE
GROWTH 27 (1989) (admitting, for the first time, that foreign financial institutions
and donor agencies, including the World Bank itself, participated in "badly chosen
and poorly designed" public sector investments which contributed to economic cri-
sis in Africa).
201. See KNIEPER, supra note 128, at 5-7 (analyzing the implications of both the
World Bank's admission and its failure to make reparations).
202. See Adekanye, supra note 181, at 372 (highlighting a link between interna-
tional financial support and the resulting conditions).
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readily identifiable forces, such as ethnicity, religion, or Prof. Franck's
"postmodemist tribalists. ' '203 Instead, if self-determination is defined as
a people's right to "freely determine their political status and freely
pursue their economic, social and cultural development,"" it becomes
evident that only the international and finance community is enjoying
that right.
Faced by a context where the international and domestic political
economies are hostile to the genuine realization of self-determination,
should we not revisit our conceptions of the right to secession, even ab-
sent preconditions of gross and consistent human rights violations de-
manded by scholars such as Hannum? °5 In other words, if the socio-
economic and political conditions are such that their deterioration
could result in a situation such as that which occurred in Bosnia or So-
malia, why not allow them the option of succession before they de-
mand it?
2. Being Heretical: Some Radical Thoughts on Secession
Traditional international law theorists have a deeply ingrained aver-
sion to contemplating the right to secede even in the abstract.'0 Few are
203. See Franck, supra note 39, at 3-4 (asserting that "post-modem tribalists"
contribute to a global phenomenon whose purpose is the "break up" of existing
sovereign states).
204. 1960 UN Declaration, supra note 44, at 67.
205. Such a suggestion is only partly rhetorical. Poppovich and Pinheiro assert that
economic growth alone is a guarantee to "change the power relations in countries
where structural imbalance is deeply ingrained in the social fabric" and thus paves the
path to development and democracy. They assert further that the distribution of eco-
nomic growth and of resources should be of first priority. "This means that countries
which have adopted a democratic political system of free elections and political free-
doms will have to implement measures of economic equality and freedoms to effec-
tively consolidate their democracy." See Malak Poppovich & Paulo Sergio Pinheiro,
How to Consolidate Democracy? A Human Rights Approach, 143 INT'L SOC. SC.
J. 75, 86 (1995) (arguing that, without such efforts, democracy would solely be
available to a ruling minority).
206. This is most evident in the views of those who deny that there is even a right
to self-determination for colonized peoples, but it is also evident in the views of osten-
sibly liberal scholars like Lloyd and Hannum. See, e.g., Lloyd, supra note 10, at 434-
35 (arguing that Southern Sudan should be allowed to secede from the rest of the
country). Lloyd states:
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willing to infer that the right to succession even exists at all, and sug-
gestions to the contrary immediately draw a retraction."' " Allen Bu-
chanan, for example, in a paper which begins by speaking of"expand-
ing options," refers to the need for "articulating principles and building
legal institutions designed to bring secession within at least the mini-
mal constraints of the rule of law," and distinguishes between seces-
sion, and "other, less extreme forms of self-determination."
Paul Goble asserts that several alternatives to secession can be at-
tempted, including federal power-sharing and the establishment of al-
ternative and more comprehensive identities upon which democratic
citizenship can rest. However, in an age when the state is becoming an
even larger player in society, Goble asserts that "the question of who
controls it becomes ever more important."'' Gottlieb echoes Goble's
assertion when he suggests that threats of secession should be met with
a new formulation that goes beyond self-determination, but does not
provide for full secession, essentially serving as a stalling tactic
Thus the presence of systematic oppression and the threat of decimation
of the population establish relatively objective indices by which to iden-
tify a 'people' vested with the right of self-determination. If such a 'peo-
ple' is found to occupy a demarcated territory, to have exhausted any na-
tional remedies [they should have a] demonstrable legal fight to
secessionist self-determination.
Id. at 431-35.
207. One brave exception to this view is Gebre Tesfagiorgis. who asserts that
international law actually recognizes the fight to secession. However, this view
may be based more on wishful thinking than on reality. See Gebre H. Tesfagiorgis,
Self-Determination: Its Evolution and Practice by the United Nations and its Ap-
plication to the Case of Eritrea, 6 Wis. INr'L L.J. 75, 92-93 (1987) (arguing that,
according to the United Nations Charter, self-determination is a fight afforded to
two groups: colonized peoples and peoples subjected to foreign domination).
208. See Allen Buchanan, Federalism, Secession and the Moralit " of Inclusion,
37 ARiz. L. REv. 53 (1995) (articulating the need for an international institutional
response to "secession crises").
209. See Goble, supra note 19, at 1683 (asserting that "unless th[e] state is to
become less important, an unlikely development in most regions, secession must
remain an option.").
210. See Gidon Gottlieb, Nations Without States. 73 FOREIGN AFF., May-June
1994, at 100 (arguing that most modem national and ethnic conflicts cannot be re-
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The UN has always sought to have it both ways. For instance, even
the 1960 Declaration that first recognized the right to self-
determination contained an effective limitation clause.21' As in the case
of Gibraltar and Spain, the state's response to claims of self-
determination has traditionally been guided by the threat of "disruption
of the national unity and territorial integrity" articulated in the UN
Charter, rather than by a discussion of the right to self-determination,
or even an affirmative recognition of such a right. 212
The roots of this bias are reflected in the rather fatalistic view that
secessionists have no greater horizons than the dominant perceptions
of the state from which they have departed:
After all, secession is merely an attempt to diminish the territorial scope
of one state's authority and replace it by the authority of another state.
Thus secession does not challenge the dominant conception of the nature
of sovereignty; it merely seeks to replicate sovereignty without question-
ing it. In that sense, secession is inherently conservative. It calls into
question neither the dominant conception of state authority nor the inter-
national order, so far as the latter takes states as the fundamental elements
of the international system."
The foregoing viewpoint assumes that secessionists are born and not
made. Rasheed asserts that the urge for autonomy is often fostered by
solved by merely moving national boundaries and advocating unions between peo-
ples rather than between territories). Gottlieb says:
States bent on extinguishing smoldering embers of ethnic strife without the
traumatic surgery of secession must make it possible for restive nations to
carry on their life free from alien rule. The principle of self-determination
must be supplemented by a new scheme that is less territorial in character and
more regional in scope.
Id.
211. See 1960 UN Declaration, supra note 44, at 67 (recognizing the right to self-
determination, but simultaneously placing severe restrictions on its implementation).
This Declaration states "[a]ny attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the
national unity and territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes
and principles of the United Nations Charter." Id.
212. See J.J. Bossano, The Decolonization of Gibraltar, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
1641, 1642 (1995) (arguing that the right of self-determination should extend to
Gibraltar, a British colony since 1713). Bossano is the Chief Minister of Gibraltar,
and the head of the Gibraltar Socialist-Labour Party. See id. at 1641.
213. Buchanan, supra note 208, at 54.
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deliberate marginalization, such that "demands by ethnic groups for
power-sharing, political freedom, greater political autonomy, and the
right to self-determination have on occasion led to large-scale reprisals
and atrocities against these groups and have often driven them to insur-
rection.""4 Rather than reaffirming the notion of statehood, which has
produced these various problems, we should consider how to make the
State more flexible, as the first stage to "statelessness."
Thus, while Buchanan's critique may be true-that some secession-
ists are simply bom that way-he also illustrates his bias by refusing to
consider how a secessionary movement could challenge the "dominant
conceptions" of sovereignty and statehood.' 5 Instead, he plunges into a
discussion of "federalism," constructed in the image of the country he
knows best, the United States, as if that is a global model to which we
should all aspire. But the worst aspect of his critique of secession is that
it sounds like the case of the shop steward who has been promoted to
manager: after getting in, s/he shuts the door.' 6 Christiano at least ad-
dresses two situations in which secession might be considered an op-
tion in theory, even though he is generally opposed to the idea of seces-
sion in practice:
First, cases of persistent minorities would have to be specially examined.
Cases of persistent minorities are pathologies of democracy which un-
dermine the sense that each individual's interests are being given equal
consideration. Second, cases where a highly unified majority treats oppo-
nents as inferiors or as mere incompetents or with simple hatred would
have to be evaluated differently. Northern Ireland may be a case of this
sort.
217
214. Sadiq Rasheed, The Democratiation Process and Popular Participation in
Africa: Emerging Realities and the Challenges Ahead, 26 DEV. & CHANGE 333,
338 (1995).
215. See Buchanan, supra note 208, at 55-56 (discussing Federalism as either an
alternative to secession, or as a "way-station" on the road to it).
216. See Bowring, supra note 2, at 77-78 (suggesting that states are more willing
to claim the right of self-determination for themselves than they are for others).
Thus, "even those states which may arguably have conceded the right of self-
determination as applicable against themselves apparently accepted decolonization
as a matter of expediency rather than as legal obligation." Id. Accordingly, it is not
inappropriate to agree with Bowring's view here.
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Louis Ren& Beres can hardly conceal his disdain for succession,
which he sees as resulting only in "violence and death." Beres states
that:
Reaffirming individual commitments to life in the "herd," these claims
contradict the idea of global oneness and cosmopolis. From identification
as Moslem Azerbaijanis or Christian Armenians or Croats or Serbs, indi-
viduals all over the world surrender themselves as persons being told
again that meaning derives from belonging. Not surprisingly, these indi-
viduals are too often willing to do anything that the group commands-
even the mass killing of other human beings, as long as the victims are
,outsiders." 2 '
Yet, many secessionist movements have emerged from situations
that make Beres' rendition sound like a tea party. The problem, thus, is
more fundamental than the act of separation per se; it is directly linked
to the fundamental reasons for the commission of human rights viola-
tions, and such violations are linked, in turn, to a host of varying fac-
tors. Underlying the various views-whatever the perspective-is a
profound pessimism, reflecting in part the uncertainty and devastation
of the times. One cannot help feeling, however, that this is also a pro-
foundly illiberal sentiment that seeks to continue the glorious days of
"cohesion," "oneness," and "conformity."
The objections to secession appear to be based much more on senti-
ment, chauvinism, and the desire for outright hegemonic control, than
on a logical, moral, or legally indisputable premise.2 9 As Nihal
217. Thomas Christiano, Secession, Democracy, and Distributive Justice, 37
ARIz. L. REV. 65, 71 (1995) (suggesting although the international community
should discourage "non-consensual secession" from democratic states, there are
limited exceptions to this rule).
218. Louis Ren6 Beres, Self-Determination, International Law and Survival on
Planet Earth, 11 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 4 (1994) (suggesting that those who
seek to achieve self-determination must also accept participation in the brutal and
deadly means that are often necessary to achieve it).
219. See Binder, supra note 13, at 225 (asserting that the post-war West is un-
comfortable with group identity). Thus, "despite its apparent endorsement of self-
determination, international law incorporates these skeptical attitudes toward group
identity and group separatism. The continuing controversy over its nationalist
component is the reason that the principle of self-determination needs defense."
See id. (suggesting that self-determination "embodies an inherent tension between
majority rule and minority separatism," thus making the concept vulnerable to cri-
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Jayawickrama tells us, the boundaries that states claim as sacrosanct,
"are man-made, having been demarcated at peace conferences during
this century by victors of the great wars." Jayawickrama argues further
that the boundaries of most colonial territories, particularly those in Af-
rica, were drawn arbitrarily,
slashing across ethnic settlements regardless of the cultural affinities that
had existed from time immemorial. Indeed, it is true to say that most eth-
nic groups precede contemporary national boundaries by hundreds, if not
thousands, of years. This desire to sanctify and perpetuate a few artificial
lines drawn on a map of the world by a succession of politicians, diplo-
mats, explorers and even adventurers, often without reference to the peo-
ple living on the land, appears to be misconceived in the context of the
international human rights regime which exists today.-
In concluding his Essay on minorities, Hannum asserts the need to
review the context and intent of several different international law
principles, including self-determination. He suggests that the Commit-
tee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights should adopt a General
Comment on self-determination (Article 1 of the Covenant), and that
the Human Rights Committee should revisit its refusal to address self-
determination complaints brought to it under the Optional Protocol to
the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Hannum further proposes
that "an independent nongovernmental Commission might be con-
vened to examine the meaning of self-determination in the post-Cold
War era and to recommend ways in which self-determination claims
can be judged by the international community before they descend into
violent confrontations. "' Jayawickrama goes further by stating that:
tique).
220. Nihal Jayawickrama, The Right of Self-Determination-A Time ]br Rein-
vention and Renewal, 57 SASK. L. REv. 1, 11 (1993) (criticizing the modem ra-
tionale for restricting the right of self-determination. which appears to be based
solely on a desire to maintain existing national boundaries).
221. Hannum, supra note 2, at 12. This appears to be a major volte-/fice in Han-
num's thinking. In an earlier article he stated in no uncertain terns that:
Justifying secession by a 'nation' or 'people' in response to anything less than
the most serious human rights violations assumes a principle to which there
has never been agreement. It assumes that each ethnic group or culture has the
right to exercise power within its own 'sovereign' state. International law
should recognize a right to secession only in the rare circumstance when the
physical existence of a territorially concentrated group is threatened by gross
violations of fundamental human rights.
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there is now an urgent need for the establishment of a commission or a
high commissioner to which or to whom the "people" will have a right of
access whenever their exercise of self-determination is either disputed or
denied. This institution should be able to evaluate upon proper legal crite-
ria, offer assistance where it appears necessary, and intercede where the
situation so warrants, and refer to the appropriate authority a matter that
requires to be adjudicated upon.2 "
These sentiments are echoed by Deborah Cass, who favors incorpo-
rating the "controversial" view of self-determination (a right extending
beyond the colonial context) into the "criteria to be applied in assessing
a claim, or resolved at the domestic level, rather than automatically
preventing the right from being exercised.""22
In light of the foregoing, I offer two basic suggestions for consid-
eration. First, the right of secession should be duly recognized under
international law, even if the exact circumstances and contours of its
exercise must be the subject of a participatory examination. Second,
national conventions should clearly stipulate the existence of such a
right, or, at a minimum, should debate the content and ambit of its•• • 224
application. Further to my first point, that the right of secession
should be recognized under international law, the words of Holly
Osterland are particularly instructive. Osterland explains that:
On the one hand, the potential for recognition of secessionist demands
will encourage multi-cultural states to preemptively rectify any abuses of
See Hurst Hannum, ReThinking Self-Determination, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1993).
222. See Jayawickrama, supra note 220, at 14 (suggesting that there is a need for an
international commission on self-determination).
223. See Deborah Z. Cass, Re-Thinking Self-Determnination: A Critical Analisis
of Current International Law Theories, 18 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 21, 39-
40 (1992) (arguing that the right of self-determination must be expanded for the
sake of its own survival as a viable concept in international law).
224. This is not a new or radical proposition, and some national constitutions
specifically provide for it. See Alemante G. Selassie, Ethnic Identitv and Constitu-
tional Design for Africa, 29 STAN. J. INT'L L., 1, 46 (1992) (delineating that the
constitutions of several Eastern European countries allow for its republics to se-
cede). The new Ethiopian constitution incorporates this right, but it has drawn
mostly negative responses. See id. at 47-49 (articulating the reasons why creating a
constitutional right to secede is both ill-advised and ill-conceived, but at the same
time admitting that such a right might deter governments from violating a minority
group's human rights because the threat of secession is too great to risk).
[15:15 1
1999] SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE NEW fILLENNIUM
the ethnic minorities, whether they amount to a nation or not. On the other
hand, potential recognition of their right to secede may encourage separa-
tist groups to go to the international legal community before resorting to
armed conflict with the unified govemment.2"
Osterland's last point--that the degree that a minority, having been
denied the right to secede, will be willing to remain only if interna-
tional human rights mechanisms are operative-is of paramount im-
portance.26
CONCLUSION: BEYOND SELF-DETERMINATION?
The central thesis of this Essay is that while the phenomenon of
self-determination is both nebulous and indeterminate in its theory, it
is often rigid and illiberal in practice. Whether racial, sexual, class,
ethnic, or group oppression gives way to genuine liberation or simply
degenerates farther into a microscopic duplication of the initial op-
pression depends upon a number of factors.
It is my contention that the international community needs to depart
from its current conceptualization of statehood. This means shearing
statehood of both its ethnocentric and hierarchical attributes and si-
multaneously confronting the negative impact multilateralism and
globalization have had upon the developing world's attempt to attain
popular sovereignty. In sum, the international community must narrow
the framework of political nexus so as to expand the content of eco-
nomic liberation. Central to the narrowed political nexus is a liberalized
approach to the free movement of peoples, which in turn must be
linked to a reinterpreted notion of the concepts of development and
sovereignty, both jointly and individually. The phenomenon of global-
ization must likewise be the subject of concerted analysis and progres-
sive action if the detrimental effects of its ramifications are to be mini-
mized.
From the preceding analysis, a holistic discussion of modem self-
determination today must address a number of factors. First and
225. See Osterland, supra note 10, at 702 (presenting arguments for bringing the
principle of self-determination within the jurisdiction of the international legal
community).
226. See iL (asserting the need for international involvement to ensure protection
of minority rights).
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foremost, it must consider the issue of class interest, crystallized in
the ownership and domination of the means of production, regardless
of whether in the United States or Mali. Self-determination (political
and economic) has always existed primarily to serve the ruling class,
regardless of whether it undermines the autonomy and interests of
the ruled. Today (and into the foreseeable future), self-determination
primarily serves to benefit the private industrial interests of the
Northern states and continues to undermine the autonomy and inter-
ests of minorities and women.
Secondly, states in modem times serve less to facilitate the dy-
namic of self-determination than they serve to impede it. Their most
important function is as a direct competitor with their own peoples
for the resources of the territories they govern. This has led states to
invest in and expand upon their monopoly over the means of vio-
lence. Furthermore, race, ethnicity, and sexual discrimination today
constitute the primary foundations upon which the hegemony of
Western-style statehood is based and extended.
It is also essential to consider how the dual phenomena of global
migration and population control, as well as the selective admission
of refugees, are the latest weapons deployed in the battle to limit
popular sovereignty and self-determination.12 ' The world has gradu-
ally become more intensively subordinated to the multi- and bi-lateral
dictates of the economics of the New World Order, an order manufac-
tured by transnational corporations and implemented by the major
multilateral institutions, viz., the World Bank and the IMF. The new
227. See KNIEPER, supra note 128, at 4 (discussing the notion of national sover-
eignty and arguing that it serves to perpetuate many of the world's problems by
marginalizing them). Knieper states that the notion of national sovereignty allows
for:
the grossly uneven distribution of private and public investment throughout
the world, the discretionary fixing of terms of trade by vertically integrated
transnational companies, the lack of social and physical infrastructure in
many countries and the malnutrition, the spread of diseases, the lack of edu-
cation, the violation of basic human rights, and the attendant misery are not
perceived as global problems so long as the hungry, the sick, the uneducated
the tortured and the miserable are confined to their [respective] territorial
states. This perception is legitimized by the concept of national sovereignty,
which automatically binds a given population to a given State.
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multilateral trade regimes from the NAFTA to the World Trade Or-
ganization are both contributing to and simultaneously undermining the
realization of the right to self-determination.,
'
The foregoing postulations are made with full anticipation of be-
ing rejected by both states and scholars alike, but that is precisely
why they are worthy of serious discussion. If the state is not wither-
ing away, at a minimum, we should accept that the historic weight of
its multifarious functions has become too heavy. Some of those
functions need modification, others should be ceded to institutions
better equipped to carry the burden of their execution, and still others
should be confined to the dust heap of history. Statehood, state de-
termination and traditional sovereignty are all strong candidates for
this last option.
Of course a singular problem that confronts the world as a whole,
and not just the issue of the self-determination of peoples, is the issue
of violence, whether monopolized in the state or dispersed among a
variety of non-state actors, such as guerilla groups and drug and arms
merchants. As Allan Rosas states:
With the demise of feudalism and the establishment of the Hobbesian
centralized state, the permanent army and the sovereign state entered into
a symbiotic relationship. At the very end of the day, the constitutional in-
dependence inherent in sovereignty has been backed up by the monopoly
of military force. '29
Nowhere is this clearer than in the on-going conflict in the former
Yugoslavia, and in the Russian routing of the Chechnyan liberation
228. See THE RIGHTS OF SUBORDINATED PEOPLES 3 (Upendra Baxi & Oliver
Mendelsohn eds., 1994) (asserting that the phenomenon of globalization plays an
essential role in this process). There is "a need to create a sense of common strug-
gle rather than [to] reinforce divisions between people. There [is] concern that we
avoid creating hierarchies of suffering, such that one people's bitter experience can
be ranked relative to others." See id. (suggesting that to compare the struggles of
different peoples serves only to antagonize them).
229. Allan Rosas, Towards Some International Law and Order, 31 J. PEACE
RES. 129, 132 (1994) (articulating Thomas Hobbes' view of sovereignty).
"[C]ommand of the militia, without other Institution, make him that hath it Sover-
eign." See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 119 (J.C.A. Gaskin. ed., Ox-
ford U. Press, 1996) (explaining the importance of the military to the stability of
the sovereign).
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fighters.
This Essay offers no fixed guidelines or a developed theoretical
framework on how we should approach the right of self-
determination in the twenty-first century, as this is not its objective.
Indeed, such an approach would defeat the participatory elements
that were decried in this Essay as being absent from the conceptuali-
zation, development, and application of the right to self-
determination. In fact, this Essay has not even sought a consensus on
an issue that has divided nations, peoples, and even individuals in its
practical manifestations. Rather, this Essay has sought to provoke
discussion and introspection, and to challenge commonly held per-
ceptions on the right to self-determination. This Essay has also
sought to flesh out the major fault lines that must be revisited as we
move to a new millennium. In doing so, perhaps it is useful to return
to the last stanza of the lyrics to the song "Imagine," quoted at the
beginning of the paper:
Imagine no possessions
I wonder if you can
No need for greed or hunger
A brotherhood of man
Imagine all the people
Sharing all the world23
If we can take the time to imagine these possibilities, we have at
least taken the first steps toward the much-needed reconceptualiza-
tion of the notion of self-determination, an essential ingredient to the
realization of a positive and progressive democratic future in the
twenty-first century.
230. LENNON, supra note I (third stanza).
208 [15:151
